


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12 FEB 1998
HQ USAREUR & 7TH ARMY
ODCSINT, ATTN: AEAGB-CI-SO
UNIT 29351
APO AE 09014 *B. J. Miller*

UNIT HISTORY(U)

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

1985

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FOREWORD

USMLM's Unit History serves several important informative functions:


- It provides an annual chronology of the Mission's operational accomplishments in overt intelligence collection.

- It summarizes developmental trends within the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and East German Armed Forces.

- It is a repository of information pertaining to USMLM's role as a military liaison mission representing the Commander in Chief, US Army Europe to the Commander in Chief, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

- It contributes to the military history program of the Armed Services.

USMLM's 1985 Unit History joins those from previous years to comprise an important record of trends, precedent and policy. As such it becomes a most useful reference document in the conduct of the Mission's daily affairs.



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UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
UNIT HISTORY
1985

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
COLLECTION

PART II

Ground Collection Activities
Air Collection Activities
Restricted Areas
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The 1985 USMLM Unit History is dedicated to Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. "Nick" Nicholson who was shot and killed by a Soviet guard in Ludwigslust, East Germany on 24 March 1985. Nick's supreme sacrifice on behalf of his country and in defense of our national security will never be forgotten. His courage, patriotism, and selfless commitment will remain an inspiration and example to all of us at the Mission and those who follow in our footsteps.



ROLAND LAJOIE
Colonel, GS
Chief of Mission

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UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
UNIT HISTORY
1985

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PART I GENERAL

A. (C) MISSION.

1. The primary mission of USMLM is to carry out responsibilities for liaison between CINCUSAREUR, on behalf of US Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR), and CINCGSFG and to serve as a point of contact for other US departments and agencies with CINCGSFG, in accordance with provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

2. The secondary and confidential mission of USMLM is to exploit its liaison status and attendant access for collection of intelligence information in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

B. (C) REFERENCES

1. TDA E1W1AUAA
2. USEUCOM DIRECTIVE 40-18, 30 Mar 78
3. USAREUR REGULATION 383-27
4. USAFE REGULATION 23-11, 03 Feb 79
5. 7452D SPECIAL ACTIVITIES SQUADRON REGULATION 23-1
6. USMC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION 5503, 17 Dec 76

C. (C) ORGANIZATION. The Huebner-Malinin Agreement (Annex A), signed in April 1947, authorized the exchange of Military Liaison Missions between the Soviet and US Military Headquarters in Germany and laid down general guidelines for their activities and for the support to be rendered by the headquarters to which they were accredited. The agreement provided for 14 accredited personnel with complete freedom to travel, except in areas of military disposition, to "include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations." A total of approximately 70 civilian and military personnel of all three services currently comprise this unique joint organization.

D. (C) STATISTICS.

1. (C) Intelligence Information Collection. In carrying out its second and classified mission, USMLM dispatched 472 reconnaissance tours into the GDR for a total of approximately 445,000 kilometers. The Mission produced 869 Intelligence Information Reports based on information acquired during these tours.

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2. (U) Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA). In 1985 HQ GSFG levied 37 TRA. Section II, paragraph C, contains details.

3. (U) Detentions and Incidents. USMLM tours were detained two times in 1985, as compared to nine in 1984. Four reportable incidents occurred, including the most serious and tragic incident in USMLM's long history, the shooting death of a USMLM officer by a Soviet soldier.

4. (U) Liaison and Representation. CUSMLM or his representative met with SERB or HQ GSFG representatives a total of 47 times to discuss a variety of topics. In the aftermath of the March 1985 fatal shooting, a series of meetings between representatives of USAREUR and of GSFG, intended to develop protective measures for the Military Liaison Missions of both sides, took place. CUSMLM and CSERB were heavily involved in agenda preparation, in formalizing language for areas of agreement, and in discussing and negotiating areas of disagreement. See Section III, paragraph B, and Annex F, Negotiations.

E. (C) ORGANIZATION.

USMLM, with its support base in West Berlin, is able to intensely utilize all 14 accreditations (passes) for operational and liaison purposes in East Germany. Details of pass utilization and of the tri-service organization are provided in succeeding sub-paragraphs:

1. Pass Utilization. The 14 accreditations provided for by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement are normally held as follows:

CUSMLM (Army)	1
Deputy Chief of Mission (DCUSMLM) (USAF)	1
Naval Representative (NAVREP) (USMC)	1
OIC, Potsdam House (Army)	1

Liaison Officers

Army	4
USAF	2

Liaison NCOs

Army	3
USAF	1

2. Army Element. The TDA in effect on 31 Dec 85 authorizes 11 officers, 26 enlisted personnel, and four Department of the Army civilians.

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3. Air Element. The Air Element is composed of five officers and 11 enlisted personnel, organized until 01 Nov 85 as Detachment 16, 7113 Special Activities Squadron. As of 01 Nov, the Air Element was redesignated the 7452d Special Activities Squadron, subordinate to the 7455th Tactical Intelligence Wing.

4. Naval Element. The USMLM naval element consists of one USMC officer.

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PART II. COLLECTION

A. (C) GROUND DIVISION COLLECTION ACTIVITIES (All elements of this section, to include photography, classified CONFIDENTIAL).

1. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS: From the perspective of the Ground Division, the past year appeared to be a period of further consolidation in the wake of the sweeping changes begun a few years ago in GSFG. The quality and quantity of Soviet equipment continued to improve and increase. Further, the structure of GSFG and its training focus also continued to change in 1985, probably in an effort to better accommodate several recently implemented tactical concepts, the most significant of which was the reconnaissance strike complex, or RUK (Russian acronym). 1985 also witnessed the departure of Army-Gen Zaitsev and the arrival of Army-Gen Pyotr Lushev as Commander-in-Chief of the GSFG.

The more noteworthy equipment changes included the continued introduction of the turbine driven T-80 tank into the southernmost armies, the 1GTA and the 8GA. The T-80 has now been identified with every division in both of these armies. In the three northern armies, the 2GTA, 3SA, and 20GA, the T-64A continued to be replaced by the missile firing T-64B at the rate of one company per tank battalion, a trend first noted by USMLM two years ago. Both of these tanks have been sighted with reactive armor in increasing numbers. To date, reactive armor has been mounted only on missile-firing tanks, the T-80 and T-64B.

Other equipment changes included: the virtual replacement of the SA-9 by the more capable SA-13 in regimental air defense batteries; the further conversion to improved mortar systems such as the Vasilek and 2Sl2; the identification of the BMP-2 in battalion-level air defense units; and the reintroduction of the 152mm Field Gun M1976. In addition, there was strong evidence that the 122mm D-30 towed howitzer, thought to have been replaced by the newer self-propelled 2Sl, was still in the inventory of several divisions subsequent to the receipt of the 2Sl.

As has become the norm since 1983, GSFG did not provide any visible support for the Soviet harvest during the past year. Lifting this onerous logistic requirement has had significant implications for overall readiness. Prior to 1983, approximately 10,000 trucks and an equal number of troops would deploy to the Soviet Union in June and July and return to East Germany in October or November, having provided assistance to collective farms for the summer harvest. This year, however, in an interesting twist, several units apparently supplied manpower to assist their East

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German socialist brothers in harvesting and transporting part of the fall potato crop for export to the Soviet Union. This activity had only a negligible effect on unit readiness, but once again illustrated the Army can and will be used by the political leadership to support the Soviet economy as conditions warrant. In point of fact, Soviet participation in the East German harvest takes place each year, although on a much lower level. Some of these potatoes are used to supplement the meager rations provided the Soviet soldier.

Another area affecting overall readiness is the troop exchange process, which peaks notably in the fall and spring as conscripts enter and leave GSFG by air. Approximately one-fourth of GSFG's troop strength is correspondingly exchanged. The method by which GSFG has ameliorated the readiness degradation caused by this substantial turnover is phase training. This program enhances training through improved unit cohesiveness, inasmuch as troops are rotated by battalion or company complements and serve together until they are discharged. This rotation system has reduced overall unit personnel turbulence and increased effective training time throughout all of GSFG. It was initiated in the early 80's and was in effect for an increased number of units in 1985.

The overall training picture presented by GSFG in 1985 was complex. High level command and control was the dominant concern. There were several exercises in which several front and army level communications units were noted, but in which very little tactical activity was observed. A subtle change towards increased tactical exercise play occurred during the second half of the training year. This shift may have occurred incident to the arrival of the new GSFG commander.

It is interesting that most tactical exercises from about 1982 to 1985 (the latter part of General Zaitsev's tenure as CINC GSFG) centered on low level, movement type exercises. This was an apparent effort to give lower echelon commanders more practical experience and responsibility, while at the same time taking advantage of the increased unit cohesiveness theoretically resulting from units spending their entire GSFG tour together. This alone represented a change from the standard exercise format prior to 1982, which predominantly called for units of greater size and strength to "chase" smaller units.

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Beyond the changes and developments in equipment and training, unit configurations were altered as well. Major unit relocations, resubordinations, and other changes were first noticed in GSFG in 1983. No fewer than five divisions either shifted subordination or relocated, while one motor rifle division reconfigured to become a tank division. This trend continued in 1985 as another division, the 6GMRD/20GA, garrisoned in Bernau, retooled and became a tank division, having changed assets and flags with the 90 GTD in Poland. In other developments, 6 Ind MR Bde, located in East Berlin and formerly carried as a direct front-level subordinate, participated in a 20GA exercise and is now believed to be part of that army. In addition, a new artillery brigade equipped with the 152mm field gun M1976, probably subordinate to the 34AD, reoccupied Potsdam 292 along with another unidentified unit equipped with 2S1 and 2S3. Finally, an army-level SS-21 brigade, subordinate to the 1GTA, was identified during the course of an exercise that took place during 1985.

As a result of these changes, no two GSFG armies appear structurally the same. The 1GTA has only three divisions, one motor rifle and two tank but has an SS-21 brigade and an independent tank regiment. The 2GTA has four divisions, three motor rifle and one tank but has three independent tank regiments. The 3SA has four tank divisions and one independent tank regiment. 8GA has one tank and three motor rifle divisions plus one independent tank regiment. The 20GA now has only one motor rifle division, three tank divisions, and an independent motor rifle brigade. This rich variety in army force lists strongly suggests individual tailoring for different wartime missions.


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2. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

a. 30 Jan - 07 Feb. A major Warsaw Pact exercise involving units from Poland, East Germany, and GSFG took place. The exercise combined units from the Silesian Military District, MD V/EGA, and the 2 GTA/GSFG. These are the same armies that had participated in YUG-84, suggesting that they all have a related wartime role. During the exercise, USMLM obtained initial confirmation of T-72 tanks with the Polish 4 Mech Division.



03-04 Feb. A large scale refueling exercise took place in conjunction with a major front-level exercise. Photo and video coverage were obtained (see next page for photos). This was the first time the Tri-Missions had observed such a refueling effort by the Soviets. This exercise reflected the Soviet concern for more realistic rear service training and represented an effort to practice more sophisticated methods of forward resupply by non-divisional logistics elements.

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19 Feb. USMLM covered a large SS-21 exercise. Other source information, thorough ground coverage and painstaking analysis ultimately indicated that 1 GTA had formed an SS-21 Bde. To date, this is the only unit of its kind in the Soviet Force Structure.



June. The largest EGA mobilization exercise ever observed by the AMLMs (and probably the largest that has occurred to date) took place at the end of May through the end of June. Several new reserve divisions were added to the order of battle for EGA forces. Regular NVA units were noted utilizing reserve troops to augment their forces. Mustering points were set up at various locations and reservists were observed at numerous spots as they were integrated into the overall exercise.

04-14 July. A Soviet-East German exercise was announced under provisions of the Helsinki Accords, with a stated troop participation level in excess of 25,000. 20 GA played the central role at Army-level. Participation of the 6 Ind MR Bde in this activity suggested that the unit was subordinate to the 20 GA, and not to GSFG (front) as previously held. The exercise apparently included the mobilization of East German reservists and Kampfgruppen, as well as the possible mobilization of Soviet reservists, including females, from GSFG to support 20 GA.

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During this exercise an FMLM tour obtained the best photos to date of 2S5, these associated with 113 GAB/20 GA.



Monitoring the return to garrison by 35 MRD/20 GA, a USMLM tour provided a detailed, close-up look at T-64B with bracket studs for mounting reactive armor (see photo next page).

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
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Coverage included stereo photography and video. T-64B with reactive armor mounted were not seen by the AMLM in 1985.



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

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01 Aug. A minimum of 23 2S3 and 29 2S1 were delivered to Potsdam Installation 292. This installation had been vacant since 1983 when the tenant unit moved to the Altengrabow PRA. It is not known whether the equipment now occupying the installation is part of the 34 AD or a different organization/structure.

15 Sep - 15 Oct. A major front-level CPX and divisional-level FTX reminiscent of ZAPAD-84 (the major Western TVD exercise that occurred in June and July 1984) was conducted. Among the units noted were extensive front-level signal battalions and regiments, the KGB/UPS signal regiment, and independent radio relay and signal regiments participation from the 1 GTA, 3 SA, 2 GTA, and 20 GA. Another East German mobilization exercise, although smaller in scope, took place as well. Elements of 11 GTD/1 GTA, with extensive participation by T-80 equipped units, deployed as part of this CPX. During this exercise, T-80s with reactive armor mounted were seen for the first time by an FMLM tour.



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30-31 Dec. A minimum of 33 152mm Field Guns M1976 were delivered to Potsdam Installation 292, adding to the confusion in determining the organization and structure of the new unit/units there. These guns probably represent a new brigade of the 34 AD. This was the first time these guns had been observed since 1983, when they were noted with the artillery brigades of the 2 GTA and the 8 GA.



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
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3. T-80 TANKS IN GSFG: Import of T-80 into GSFG continued throughout 1985. USMLM monitored rail lines and obtained excellent photo and video coverage of the shipments of probable T-80 in environmental containers to 8 GA and 1 GTA.



1985 provided the Tri-Missions with increasing opportunities to collect photography and data on T-80. In January, T-80 attributed to the 79 GTD/8 GA were seen for the first time with bracket studs for mounting reactive armor, similar to those seen on T-64B.

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
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Tri-Mission vigilance on the tactical trails near Koenigsbrueck/
Ortrand was rewarded in August with additional T-80 photography
(acquired by BRIXMIS), including closeup views of the front glacis.



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In late September and early October T-80 equipped elements of 11 GTD/1 GTA participated in an FTX that started in the Jueterbog PRA and ended in the Letzlinger Heide PRA. Four teams from all three Missions covered various stages of this move, which yielded the first sighting of T-80 with mounted reactive armor as photographed by FMLM. This alone was unusual, as Soviet units with reactive armor equipped T-64B had previously taken great pains to remove the 'boxes' prior to out of garrison movement.



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
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Following that exercise, USMLM tours continued to monitor the rail lines west of the Letzlinger Heide Training Area and noted rail loadouts of elements of 79 GTD/8 GA which included T-80 (reactive). Different stages of addition of reactive armor were evident, giving a closer look at the reactive armor boxes and their mounting bracket configuration.



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As the close of 1987, T-80s have been deployed with all seven divisions in USMC's southern two regions. Altogether, 17 of 28 maneuver regiments in these divisions have re-equipped with this new, tank-like-driven tank. T-80 is five of those regiments west coast.

Since this tank was first sighted in USMC in March 1987, of least 1000 have been inspected as replacements for the aging T-62.




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At the close of 1985, T-80s have been deployed with all seven divisions in GSFG's southern two armies. Altogether, 17 of 28 maneuver regiments in these divisions have re-equipped with this new, turbine-driven tank. T-80 in five of those regiments mount reactive armor.

Since this tank was first sighted in GSFG in March 1983, at least 1200 have been introduced as replacements for the aging T-62.



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4. OTHER SIGNIFICANT SIGHTINGS:

-January: USMLM tours followed up on coverage begun in December 1984 of probable Spetsnaz (SPF) personnel laying cable in the vicinity of Wernigerode, near the inter-German border. Approximately 40 km of buried cable was traced in a coordinated Tri-Mission effort.

-23 January: Serial numbers and metallic scrapings were obtained from the front glacis of a T-64A. This data, provided exclusively by USMLM, supplemented similar information obtained in 1984, thus providing analysts with additional information on Soviet tank production and metallurgy.

-22 February: USMLM provided first-time collection of soil samples from a GSFG training area, which furnished proof of Soviet training in the use of chemical simulants.

-January, March, September: Improvements in Soviet and East German heavy lift capabilities were apparent in 1985. The first photography of the CHMZAP-9990 transporter trailer in GSFG was obtained in January. The same type trailer was noted in September being towed by an improved tractor, the MAZ-537 (85)B. This equipment, associated with the Heavy Lift Bn of the 56 Motor Transport Brigade, was photographed for the first time in GSFG.



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-An unidentified lowbed trailer was seen for the first time with East German Border Troops; this was one further illustration of the overall improvement in heavy lift capabilities.




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-05 June: Photos of BRASS NECK, a ZIL-131 box bodied vehicle. This vehicle has been associated with East German Border Cmd /MFS/RECS units.



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-12 Jun 85 (BRXMIS); 29 Sep 85 (US): The R-416 special-purpose, radio relay communications system was observed for the first time in GSFG. The identification of the R-416 was of particular importance for two reasons: its actual physical appearance was unknown; and as the programmed replacement for the R-406/MERCURY PLATE, its deployment would probably also serve as a rare equipment-only signature for the General Staff-subordinate 6th Sig Bde (RVGK). Although the system was actually first seen by another Mission in June, its true identity and subordination were interpreted as CONE DISH related. The major GSFG front-level exercise in late September - early October permitted USMLM analysts to finally make the correct determination that the R-416 had been deployed.



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11 September: A USMC team obtained the first ground photograph of the RVN M-100, an M100-class M-100 (M-100) in East Germany. The vehicle was conclusively associated with Military District III.



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-11 September: A USMLM tour obtained the first ground photograph of the ACV M-1984, an MTLB-based R-330B jammer, in East Germany. The vehicle was tentatively associated with Military District III.




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-31 October: Several cargo trucks from the U/I Material Support Battalion of the 35 MRD were observed transporting potatoes in the north central area of the GDR. An attendant at an East German gas station claimed that all the trucks with a 'K' (Kartoffel) on their windshields were involved in the harvest of potatoes. He added that some of the potatoes were being shipped back to the Soviet Union because of the poor crop there this year.



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Collection was not limited to tours in East Germany. USMLM analysts noted a modified SA-7 SAM launcher in the 28 Aug issue of Red Star. Sensing this might be the newly fielded replacement for the SA-7, the SA-14, they promptly alerted the intelligence community to the system's appearance. Subsequent evaluation indicated this was probably the new SA-14 shoulder-fired SAM.



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B. AIR COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

NOTE: All succeeding sub-paragraphs classified CONFIDENTIAL.

1. General:

a. Aircraft and Air Operations:

1) Soviet:

a) Helicopters: The general upgrading of attack regiments continued throughout the year as more HIND E were modified with 30mm twin cannon and infrared jammers. Training activity with the larger 80mm rocket pod and additional AT-6 SPIRAL ATGM mounts was observed more frequently. The attack helicopter regiment at Brandis Soviet Airfield was relocated to Allstedt Soviet Airfield (approximately 80km closer to the West German border) and the independent helicopter ECM squadron (HIP J's and K's) at Allstedt moved into the auxiliary airfield at Cochstedt. Construction had been observed there for what is now assessed as permanent facilities for the squadron. Immediately after their relocation to Cochstedt, which is more accessible to MLM observation, HIP H with ECM modifications was photo confirmed with the squadron. The HIP H (ECM-MOD) is very similar to the HIP K, but has the more advanced MI-17 airframe; minor differences include an unidentified wing-shaped blade antenna. In conjunction with these relocations, the Division Helicopter Support Squadron from Allstedt deployed to Schlotheim Auxiliary Airfield. This has also become a permanent relocation.

b) Fixed Wing: The year was highlighted by new aircraft coming into country. FROGFOOT, the newest Soviet ground attack aircraft, deployed to Brandis Soviet Airfield. Only one squadron of FROGFOOT and its ALBATROS trainer aircraft have been observed so far. However, we expect this to be enlarged to a full regiment, replacing the attack helicopter regiment that moved to Allstedt. Brand Soviet Airfield upgraded one squadron of FENCER C to FENCER D. The FENCER C squadron relocated into Grossenhain Soviet Airfield, making that the second FENCER base in GSFG. We expect Grossenhain's FITTER D aircraft to be replaced by a full regiment of FENCER. The upgrade to FLOGGER J (MOD) has also continued this year. All three FLOGGER ground attack regiments (Altenburg; Finsterwalde; Mirow) have the new airframe which is gradually replacing FLOGGER D squadrons. Training and range activity did not follow the normal cycle of events this year. Most notably, the live TASM launches that usually occur during predictable periods were observed randomly throughout the year. An unusual amount of night training was also noted, using flares and mixed airframe tactics.

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The live arms training included seldom observed external stores such as the AS-14B (TV-guided) TASM, laser guided bomb, and simulated nuclear bomb.

2) East German:

a) Helicopters: Standard flying and training activity were observed during the year. Although more helicopters with the infrared jammer and flare dispensers were observed, no significant changes occurred.

b) Fixed Wing: The newly constructed airfield at Laage became operational this year, receiving the first FITTER K in the EGAF inventory. In addition to the latest production model FITTER, the EGAF are also using the latest Soviet external stores. The EG FITTER K has been observed with reconnaissance pods (Combination A), ECM pods (ODD POD), and, for the first time in the forward area, a self-defense flare dispenser attached on the fuselage near the scoop. Other EGAF upgrades include the first sighting of FISHBED L, probable replacement for the older FISHBED D/F, and the use of CURL for carrying bombs.

b. Electronics/SAMs:

1) Soviet: The TIN SHIELD (three-dimensional radar) was photo confirmed with GSFG this year. The TIN SHIELD was observed at two EG sites. The LONG TRACK D was photographed with similar modifications to those observed on the LONG TRACK C MOD in 1984. Numerous sightings now confirm that most LONG TRACK C and D are being upgraded with these modifications. The communications network was also expanded with the deployment of CONE DISH in the Northern Defense Zone to match the Southern Zone.

2) East German: The TIN SHIELD was first sighted this year with EG forces at Brennersgruen EW Site. This is yet another example of the East Germans receiving first-line Soviet equipment. The U/I construction sites reported last year (Schoenermark; Fehrbellin; Zachow) are now confirmed as East German SA-3 sites. Zachow is still under construction, but the other two are now operational, with SA-3 equipment confirmed.


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2. Significant Achievements:

a. On 23 March, the LONG TRACK D was observed at Gera Soviet SA-4 Site, with modifications to the sail and END BOX similar to those previously observed on the LONG TRACK C.



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b. On 21 May, the best photography to date was taken of the laser-guided bomb (third sighting in GSFG). Two bombs were carried on a FLOGGER J MOD during flying activity observed at Finsterwalde Soviet Airfield.



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c. On 3 June, the FENCER D was first photographed in GSFG, depicting the new radome and probable laser designator. The FENCER D is presently at squadron level at Brand Soviet Airfield.



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d. On 6 July, the HIP H (ECM-MOD) was photo confirmed in GSFG with the Independent Helicopter ECM Squadron at Cochstedt Soviet Airfield.




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e. On 26 August, the first technical-quality photograph was taken of the AS-14B TASM. The TASM was observed on a FLOGGER J during a range program at Gadow Rossow Soviet Air-to-Ground Range.




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f. On 26 September, FENCER C was observed ejecting fuel while circuiting to final approach at Grossenhain Soviet Airfield.



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g. On 8 October, photography of the FROGFOOT was taken during a circuit program at Brandis Soviet Airfield, revealing the first bort numbers of the new squadron. The FROGFOOT was first observed in GSFG on 18 September 1985.



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h. On 22 October, photography taken of FITTER K from Laage EG Airfield showed a probable flare dispenser pod attached to the dorsal spine. This is the first sighting of this device in the forward area. The FITTER K was first observed with EGAF on 3 March 1985.



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i. On 26 November, the TIN SHIELD three-dimensional radar was photo confirmed at Wachstedt Soviet EW Site. This was the first time the TIN SHIELD was observed with GSFG. The radar was first confirmed in country on 13 February at Brennersgruen EG EW Site.

2. TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS (TRAs)

a. In 1987, HQ GSG-5 imposed a total of 37 Temporarily Restricted Areas (TRAs), down from the 48 imposed during 1984. The decrease in the number of TRAs is possibly a function of the increased protection provided by the PRA map issued in May 1984. As of 14 May 1984, HQ GSG-5 had imposed 25 TRAs; as of the same date in 1987, only 14 TRAs were imposed.

b. Patterns and trends noted in the issue of multiple TRAs lead to the belief that most of the TRAs were exercise/evacuation-related.

c. TRAs imposed during 1987:

1) TRAs 001-45 through 007-45 were imposed before, during and after a major Soviet/East German/Polish exercise, and, together with their adjacent PRAs, formed a complete ring of restricted areas around Berlin.

2) TRAs 008-45 through 013-45 were imposed during a period of time, and are believed to have included exercise/evacuation. As with TRAs 001-45 through 007-45, TRAs 008-45 through 013-45 formed almost a complete ring of restricted areas surrounding Berlin.



3) TRAs 004-45 and 005-45 were both effective 03-15 February. These two TRAs, along with TRAs 001-45 through 003-45, completed the ring of restricted areas surrounding Berlin.

4) TRAs 006-45 through 012-45 were all imposed during a period of time, and are believed to have included exercise/evacuation. As with TRAs 001-45 through 007-45, TRAs 006-45 through 012-45 formed almost a complete ring of restricted areas surrounding Berlin.

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C. RESTRICTED AREAS

1. PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS (PRA). The PRA map, which went into effect on 16 May 1984, remained unchanged during 1985. The Soviets hinted on several occasions during the year that the PRA map would be revised to reduce the percentage of restricted area within the GDR; however, a new PRA map never materialized.

2. TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS (TRA).

a. In 1985, HQ GSFG imposed a total of 37 Temporary Restricted Areas (TRAs), down from the 48 imposed during 1984. The decrease in the number of TRAs is possibly a function of the increased protection provided by the PRA map issued in May 1984. As of 16 May 1984, HQ GSFG had imposed 25 TRAs; as of the same date in 1985, only 16 TRAs were imposed.

b. Patterns and trends noted in the issue of multiple TRAs lead to the belief that most of the TRAs were exercise/movement-related.

c. TRAs imposed during 1985:

1) TRAs 001-85 through 007-85 were imposed before, during and after a major Soviet/East German/Polish exercise, and, together with their adjacent PRAs, formed a complete ring of restricted areas around Berlin.

a) TRA 001-85 (effective 25 January - 06 February) and TRA 005-85 (effective 30 January - 06 February) connected the Border PRA and the Jueterbog PRA, protecting the traditional tactical routes between the Jueterbog Training Area and the Lieberose Training Area.

b) TRAs 002-85, 003-85 and 004-85, all effective 25 January - 12 February, connected the Templin, Wittstock, Rathenow, Letzlinger Heide and Altengrabow PRAs. These TRAs protected traditional exercise movement routes, bivouac sites and the Northern Elbe River crossing sites.

c) TRAs 006-85 and 007-85 were both effective 05-15 February. These two TRAs, along with TRAs 001-85 through 005-85, completed the ring of restricted area surrounding Berlin.

2) TRAs 008-85 through 012-85 were all imposed during a like period of time, and are believed to have shielded exercise/movement. As with TRAs 001-85 through 007-85, TRAs 008-85 through 012-85 formed almost a complete ring of restricted areas surrounding Berlin.

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a) TRAs 008-85, 009-85 and 010-85 were all effective 05-20 March, and connected the Templin, Wittstock and Rathenow PRAs. These TRAs restricted tri-mission access to exercise/movement routes traditionally used in that area.

b) TRA 011-85, effective 10-23 March, connected the Altengrabow and Jueterbog PRAs and denied tri-mission access to the traditional maneuver routes between the Altengrabow and Jueterbog Training Areas.

c) TRA 012-85, effective 10-20 March, connected the Jueterbog and Grossenhain PRAs.

3) TRAs 013-85, 014-85, 015-85 and 016-85, all effective 14-20 April 1985, were imposed during the period of an East German MD V Exercise. These four TRAs, along with PRAs in their respective areas, formed a virtually continuous ring of restricted area around Berlin.

4) TRAs 017-85 through 024-85 shielded a major Soviet exercise, and, once again, formed a complete ring of restricted area around Berlin.

a) TRAs 017-85, 018-85, 019-85, 020-85, and 021-85 prohibited tri-mission coverage of exercise routes between the Lehnin, Jueterbog, Altengrabow, Letzlinger-Heide and Rathenow PRAs. TRAs 017-85, 018-85 and 019-85 were effective 30 June - 14 July, while TRAs 020-85 and 021-85 were effective 30 June - 17 July.

b) TRA 022-85 was effective 03-15 July, while TRA 023-85 was effective 03-16 July.

c) TRA 024-85, effective 05-15 July, connected the Lubtheen, Schwerin, Demin, Guestrow and Parchim PRAs.

5) TRA 025-85, effective 27-31 July, denied tri-mission coverage in an area of the Harz Mountains rarely used by maneuver elements, and may have covered Spetznaiz or East German activity.

6) TRA 026-85, effective 30 July - 03 August, restricted tri-mission access to road and rail routes west into the Wittstock Training Areas, and may have covered the introduction of SA-5 equipment to the Kraatz SA-5 Site. Both TRAs 025-85 and 026-85 had unusual start and finish times.

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7) TRA 027-85, effective 02-06 August, connected the northern portion of the Letzlinger Heide PRA with the East/West German Border PRA. It denied tri-mission an often used temporary communications site.

8) TRA 028-85, effective 18-22 August, shielded tactical routes between the Lubtheen and Parchim PRAs.

9) TRA 029-85, effective 22-23 August, covered wheeled and tactical routes used to move west toward the Templin area. A new installation, with suspected SCALEBOARD association, is located in this area.

10) TRA 030-85, effective 23-25 August, covered tactical and wheeled vehicle routes between the Jueterbog and Altengrabow PRAs.

11) TRAs 031-85 through 035-85 may have been imposed to cover a Front-level exercise involving elements of Special Purpose Forces, the 1 GTA, 3 SA and 8 GA.

a) TRA 031-85, effective 25 September - 07 October, shielded access to observation points used in the vicinity of Brandis Airfield, which had recently received a full regiment of 50 SU-25 Frogfoot aircraft. It also shielded road and rail movement routes used by elements of the 20 GMRD from their installations in the Grimma PRA to the Altengrabow and Letzlinger Heide Training Areas.

b) TRA 032-85, effective 25 September - 07 October, shielded access to observation points used to observe Naumburg Training Areas and those used to observe air activity from Allstedt Airfield.

c) TRA 033-85, effective 26 September - 05 October, connected the Neubrandenburg and Templin PRAs, and denied access to areas suspected in the past to have been used for training by both SCALEBOARD and Special Purpose Forces units.

d) TRA 034-85 (effective 26 September - 05 October) and TRA 035-85 (effective 26 September-07 October), along with TRAs 030-85 and 031-85, denied allied mission coverage of road and rail movement routes to the Altengrabow, Letzlinger Heide and Wittstock Training Areas and the Northern Elbe River crossing/training sites.

e) TRA 036-85, effective 17-24 November, covered tactical and wheeled vehicle routes normally used by 3 SA elements moving from the Quedlinburg PRA into the Altengrabow PRA, and also denied tri-mission observation of the Niederndodeleben RADCOM and Beckendorf Soviet EW Sites and access to Cochstedt Soviet Airfield.

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f) TRA 037-85, effective 17-24 November, covered tactical and wheeled vehicle routes used by 1 GTA units moving from the Koenigsbrueck Training Area to the Weisswasser Training Area.

3. SUMMARY.

a. There were 106 days in 1985 when at least one TRA was in effect against Allied Missions. No TRAs were in effect during the months of May and December. The TRAs averaged 11.3 days each, ranging from 3 to 19 days in length.

b. The following table shows TRA days, by month, in 1985:

January 1985	25-31
February 1985	01-15
March 1985	05-23
April 1985	14-20
May 1985	None Imposed
June 1985	30
July 1985	01-17, 27-31
August 1985	01-06, 18-25
September 1985	25-30
October 1985	01-07
November 1985	17-24
December 1985	None Imposed

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D. DETENTIONS AND INCIDENTS (All succeeding subparagraphs classified CONFIDENTIAL unless otherwise indicated).

1. General. In carrying out USMLM's two missions in the GDR, accredited personnel repeatedly come into contact with Soviet and East German military personnel and the civilian population. The nature of certain of these contacts is such that reporting to higher headquarters and mention in the Unit History are appropriate. These contacts are divided into two categories:

a. DETENTION. Tour's freedom of movement is physically restricted. Accreditation documents are surrendered with or without the preparation by the Soviets of an official protocol (Akt). Circumstances surrounding a detention may be such that it is also reported as an incident.

b. INCIDENT.

1) Serious Incident. A relatively grave occurrence whose resolution may require action at a higher level than Chief USMLM/Chief SERB. Action taken frequently includes an exchange of letters at Chief of Staff or higher level.

2) Minor Incident. Occurrence whose resolution can be accomplished at the Chief of Mission/Chief SERB level or which requires no additional action.

2. DETENTIONS. Two USMLM tours were detained in 1985:

a. Zeuden (UT4368), 040925A Feb 85. A USMLM tour observing extensive Soviet exercise-related movement was detained by two armed soldiers. A number of other Soviet personnel and vehicles appeared at the scene, to include a representative of the Jueterbog Kommandatura, who arrived at 1130 hours. The Kommandatura representative acknowledged that the tour was not in a restricted area (The first Soviet officer on the scene claimed that the area was closed to Mission travel and had been so declared since 01 Feb; the area was included in TRA 006-85, issued on 041430A Feb 85.) and indicated that the detention was the result of "energetic young soldiers" who claimed the tour had photographed a military field location. After preparation of an Akt, its approval by the Jueterbog Kommandant, and the tour officer's refusal to sign it, the tour was released at 1535 hours.

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b. Suhl/Finsterberg (PB2711), 071240B Sep 85. A USMLM tour checking a Soviet communications site for EOB information and for possible new equipment was observed by a Soviet soldier. Exit from the area was accomplished by backing up along a dirt track. An attempt was made to reverse direction at the first open area. A roll of wire was concealed in the underbrush; wire became wrapped around the axle of the tour vehicle, immobilizing the tour on the spot. As the tour personnel were in process of removing tools from the trunk, a GAZ-66 approached the tour vehicle at a high rate of speed. The tour officer and NCO reentered the tour vehicle and locked the doors. The GAZ-66 grazed the tour vehicle at the left rear corner and scraped its left side. Several Soviet soldiers, commanded by a lieutenant, surrounded the vehicle and effected a detention. Subsequently a Soviet major, apparently the lieutenant's superior officer, arrived in a vehicle whose VRN is carried by USMLM for the 118 Sig Bde. Later arrivals included three German soldiers, who, along with the Soviet major and an accompanying civilian, photographed the tour vehicle, despite the tour officer's protests. At one point, a Soviet soldier unslung his weapon and pointed it at the tour officer to prevent the latter's leaving the tour vehicle (Subsequently the Soviets removed the clip from the weapon to demonstrate that it was in fact unloaded.). The Ohrdruf Kommandant arrived on the scene at 1850B hours, some six hours after the detention began. He explained that he was newly assigned, unfamiliar with the area, and had been unable to find the detention site. The tour vehicle was towed to a spot 600-700 meters from the detention site, near an MRS where, despite the tour officer's heated protests, additional photographs of the tour vehicle and MRS were taken. The Soviets and the tour crew, after two and one-half hours of hard work, managed to remove the wire. The tour then departed after a detention of nine hours duration. As a point of interest, GSFG authorities displayed an unprecedented degree of concern about the effects of this detention: COL Medved', the Acting Chief, SERB, called the Chief of Mission at the latter's quarters to assure him that, while there was a bit of a problem, everything was under control.

3. Incidents. Four reportable incidents occurred in 1985:

A. Doebein (US6765), 291050A Jan 85. A USMLM tour collided with an East German civilian coal truck when the East German driver ignored a yield sign and entered the road on which the tour vehicle was travelling. VOPO personnel and the Riesa Kommandant handled the subsequent investigation; their behavior was described as correct and cordial. The tour departed the scene at 1515 hours.

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B. Wismar (PE5874), 211530A Feb 85. A USMLM tour returning from coverage of a Soviet artillery column encountered a VOPO vehicle, reversed direction and proceeded slowly along the road, intending to enter a field and travel cross-country. A second VOPO vehicle, preceded by an East German civilian Trabant, approached the tour vehicle from the opposite direction. The Trabant veered into the tour vehicle's lane, and a collision ensued, with minor damage to the Trabant. In accordance with USMLM standard procedures, the tour vehicle stopped. At 1615 hours a representative of the Soviet Wismar garrison arrived and at 1717 the Schwerin Kommandant. The tour officer protested the reckless, irresponsible behavior of the Trabant driver and the VOPO attempt to destroy evidence of this behavior by erasing skid marks. At 1754 the Kommandant indicated that the investigation was completed and that the tour was free to depart the area.

C. Ludwigslust (PE6808), 241520A Mar 85. A Soviet sentry shot and killed MAJ Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr, a member of USMLM. Detailed reporting and discussion are in other sections of this history.

D. Satzkorn (UU6414), 130015B Jul 85. After completing coverage of the return to garrison of elements of the 35 MRD, a USMLM tour noticed a Soviet ZIL-130 closing at high speed from the rear. Tour maintained its previous speed, accelerating only when the Soviet vehicle came dangerously close. The Soviet vehicle continued to give chase, and the tour attempted to turn off the main road to return to the Potsdam House. The ZIL-130 struck the tour vehicle in the rear. Apprehensive as to the intentions of the occupants of the Soviet vehicle, the tour continued to the sanctuary of the Potsdam House. The Soviet vehicle, with a damaged front end, turned up at the main entrance to the house, having followed the trail of leaking fuel left by the tour vehicle. A heated confrontation ensued between the Soviet personnel, a warrant officer and a senior sergeant, both VAI members, and the Chief of Mission, who had been a passenger in the USMLM vehicle. The Soviets stated that they had intended to detain the tour and had been going too fast to avoid the collision; they denied any intention to ram the US vehicle. SERB was notified, and LT Styopkin and LTC Martynov, the Potsdam Kommandant, arrived shortly thereafter. The Chief of Mission vehemently protested the dangerous and unwarranted behavior of the Soviet service members.

It was later determined that the Chief of Mission suffered a fractured eye socket which required a short hospitalization.

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E. (C) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT (IIR) PRODUCTION.

USMLM IIR production figures for 1985 are listed below; 1984 figures for the same category follow in parentheses:

AIR DIVISION (1 215)

USMLM Originated:	064 (095)
Based on Allied Reports:	063 (107)
SANDDUNE Reports:	014 (013)
Total:	141 (215)

GROUND DIVISION (2 215)

USMLM Tour Reports:	280 (248)
SANDDUNE Reports:	280 (252)
Based on Allied Reports:	139 (143)
Total:	699 (643)

NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE REPORTS (5 215):

Air Reports	00 (09)
Ground Reports	07 (34)
SANDDUNE Reports	07 (17)
Bio Reports	15 (01)
Total:	29 (61)

TOTAL ALL IIR: 869 (952)

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PART III LIAISON AND REPRESENTATION

A. (C) OFFICIAL VISITORS: Visits by members of the intelligence community and others with a professional interest in USMLM's collection activity promote an informative dialogue which assists USMLM in its efforts to maintain an effective and active collection program.

The following is a selected list of key personnel briefed by USMLM in Berlin during 1985:

JANUARY

MG Robert B. Patterson	Cdr, 322d ALD
COL William A. Evers	322d ALD
Mr James George	NSA, A26
Mr John P. Dorsey	DIA, Rqmts/Eval Br
GEN Maxwell R. Thurman	Vice Chief of Staff, USA
COL Stroup	XO, Vice Chief of Staff, USA
COL Benchoff	Cdr, Red River Army Depot
MG John H. Mitchell	USCOB

FEBRUARY

GEN Glenn K. Otis	CINCUSAREUR
COL Philip McFadden	XO, CINCUSAREUR
Mr Charels M. Waespy	DIA, Chief Scientist
Mr Rudolf G. Buser	NVEOL
Mr Albert W. Murdock	USAINSCOM
COL John C. Borling	Asst to CofS, SHAPE
ADM Wesley L. McDonald	Supreme Allied Cdr, Atlantic
CAPT (USN) Salvatore F. Gallo	Executive Asst, Supreme
	Allied Cdr, Atlantic
Mr Dennis Kenneally	Dep Asst Sef AF for Reserve
	Affairs
COL Wayne Brendel	Ch, Mobilization Div, OSAF
COL Charles J. Searock, Jr.	XO, DCINC EUCOM
MG Lewis G. Curtis	USAFE/LG
COL James Drury	USAFE/LG
COL Richard Stromfors	USAFE/XOORZ (Ops Recon)

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MARCH

MG William Breckner	Cdr, 17 AF
BG Charles F. Scanlon	DCG, USAINSCOM
COL Kenneth D. Roney	Cdr, FSB
COL James L. Zachery	Cdr, 10 SFG (A)
MG Richard M. Pascoe	CofS, USAFE
COL Ralph S. Rothstein	Dep XO to CofS, USAFE
COL John J. Salvador	USAFE/DP
COL Gerald E. Hahn	Comptroller, USAFE
Mr John Breckinridge	CIA, Branch Chief, German Affairs
	Dep Chief, US Del, Stockholm Conference
Dr Lynn M. Hansen	

APRIL

Rep (IN) Elwood Hillis	House Armed Svcs Committee
MG William L. Kirk	USAFE/DO
VADM Robert F. Schoultz	CINCUSNAVEUR
CAPT (USN) Jerry B. Houston	DCS/OPS USNAVEUR

MAY

Mr Noel C. Koch	Dep Asst SecDef for National Scty
COL William J. Donahue	National War College
Mr John F. Gilhooly	National War College
CDR Glen E. Eckley	National War College
LtCol Richard Farkas	National War College
CDR Robert V. Foley	National War College
LtCol Robert C. Helt	National War College
Ms Joann M. Jenkins	National War College
LtCol Joseph C. Kinego	National War College
LTC Michael D. Krause	National War College
COL Kenneth E. McAlear	National War College
LtCol Russell I. Moore	National War College
CAPT (USN) James W. Pate	National War College
CAPT (USN) Dennis A. Pignotti	National War College
Mr David H. Williams	National War College
CDR Robert R. Wittenberg	National War College
Mr Charles A. Hawkins	Dep Asst SecDef, Intell
COL Thayer Cummings	Escort Officer
Mr Robert G. Hill	FSTC, Coll Req Mgr
COL Henry Gass	EUCOM, Asst POLAD

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COL Craig H. Boice
 COL John P. Dickey
 COL John C. Leary
 Mr John K. Ready
 BG Daniel A. Taylor, Jr.
 ADM (Ret) Harry D. Train II
 COL Maralin K. Coffinger
 COL Lawrence E. Huggins
 COMO Anthony A. Less
 BG Henry C. Stackpole III
 COMO James E. Taylor
 COL Rodney D. Wolfe
 COL George Kirschenbauer
 COL Wolfgang E. Samuel
 GEN Bennie L. Davis
 COL Ronald J. Ayotte
 Ms Susan J. Crawford
 Mr Thomas W. Taylor
 MG Edward J. Heinz
 Mr John J. Platter
 BG William B. Webb
 BG Dudley R. Gordon
 CAPT (USN) Alan R. Wile, Jr.
 COL William R. Gray, Jr.
 LtCol Nancy S. Braswell
 LTC James A. Thomas III
 COL Jimmy Walker
 Rep (GA) George W. Darden
 Rep (SC) Robin Tallon

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 CINCSAC
 DIA
 Army General Counsel
 Euro Intel Dir Conference
 Euro Intel Dir Conference
 Euro Intel Dir Conference
 Euro Intel Dir Conference
 Euro Intel Dir Conference
 Euro Intel Dir Conference
 Euro Intel Dir Conference
 Euro Intel Dir Conference
 AFMIC
 House Armed Svcs Committee
 Merchant Marine & Agriculture
 Committee

JUNE

BG Roger J. Price
 LTC Ronald L. Gambolati
 MAJ Harold W. Elliott
 Mr Verne Orr
 MG John A. Collins
 BG Ralph Havens
 COL John J. McLaughlin
 COL Chester W. Griffin
 Mr Jacques P. Klein
 Mr John T. Halbert
 LtCol Sally L. Davidson
 Mr Leonard E. Patterson

DCSOPS USAREUR
 ODCSI USAREUR
 OSJA USAREUR
 Secretary of the Air Force
 Chief of Chaplains, USAF
 Cdr, 86 TFW
 Mil Asst to SAF
 Chief, SAF Staff Gp
 Asst to SAF, International
 Affairs
 Asst Dir/Ops, SAF/PA
 Ex Asst, SAF
 Scty Advisor, SAF

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COL Lonnie R. Spivey
BG Joseph W. Ashy
MG Eugene H. Fischer
MG Lincoln Jones III
Mr John Guy
MG Harold Davis
BG Robert A. Norman
GEN Charles L. Donnelly

Cdr, 7350 ABG
Cdr, 57 FWW
Cdr, USAF Tac Ftr Wpns Ctr
DCG, V Corps
NSA, T-5 Dep Chief
Cdr, Southern Area Task Force
Cdr, 601 TCW
CINCUSAFE

JULY

Rep (CT) John Rowland
Mr Mike Habib
Mr John O. Marsh
Sen (TX) William Gramm
Rep (TX) Eldon Boulter
Rep (TX) Thomas Delay
LTG Carl A. Cathey
LTG Andrew P. Chambers

House of Representatives
State Dept, Dir EUR-CE
Secretary of the Army
US Senate
House of Representatives
House of Representatives
Vice CINCUSAFE
CG, VII Corps

AUGUST

BG Sam Greene
Mr James Dobbins
MG Harry E. Soyster
COL Paul Cummings

Cdr EISD, USAFE
Dep Ch of Mission AMEMB Bonn
Cdr, USAINSCOM
Cdr, 4513 ATTG

SEPTEMBER

COL L. Lloyd
COL Jeszenszky
COL Potter
Mr Fritz Ermarth

COL George Kolt

LTG William E. Odom
COL Jay Jaynes
Mr George D. Katz
COL Robert J. Thrasher
BG Larry Church
COL Arnom Harris
COL Ed Motyka
GEN Glenn K. Otis

Cdr, Army Avn, Heidelberg
ODCSOPS USAREUR
ODCSOPS USAREUR
Nat Intel Off for European
Affairs, CIA
Acting Nat Intel Off for
European Affairs, CIA
DIRNSA
Cdr, 6912 ESG
DIA, Estimates
DIA, Estimates
DCSI USAFE
USAINSCOM
USDAO Warsaw, Air Attache
CINCUSAREUR

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OCTOBER

COL Dan Panzenhagen
MG William J. Breckner, Jr.
LTG Thomas Richards
Mr Joseph Ardinger
Mr Paul Waldon
Mr Francis Newton
Mr Tidal W. McCoy

MG Sloan R. Gill
MG James R. Hall
COL Charles Blanchard
COL Gary L. Paxton

COL Geoffrey Kleb
COL William Foley
BG John C. Scheidt
COL Hugh Whatley
COL Nicholas Yankowski
COL John W. Doxey
BG Wayne W. Lambert

COL Richard L. Thompson
COL Eugene V. Kleiser
Mr Jack Earhart
Mr John Vogel

USAFE/IN
Cdr, 17 AF
Cdr, Air University
DIA, Estimates
DIA, Estimates
OSAF, A2
Asst SAF for Manpower,
Reserves & Installations
Chief AF Reserves
Cdr, MILPERCEN
OPMD, Off Dist Div
EPMD, Combat Arms Career
Development
ODCSI USAREUR, Ch Pdn Div
OACSI, Ch HUMINT Div
Cdr, 65 Air Div

Cdr AF Spec Activities Ctr
Eur Spec Activities Area
Cdr, Strategic Air Cmd/ 7th
Air Div
Dir of Log, 7th Air Div
Dir of Opns, 7th Air Div
Analyt Dir Rep to USCINCEUR
Analyt Dir Rep to AMEMB Bonn

NOVEMBER

GEN John Chain
COL John Borling
Mr David Duberman
Mr David M. Marks
LtCol Ford Mosely
CDR R. A. Storwick

BG Charles Scanlon
COL (Ret) Robert E. Jones
MG Thomas G. McInerney
COL William R. Studer
COL Sam Westbrook, III
COL Dale W. Thompson
COL Lester P. Brown, Jr.
COL Robert S. Ridgway

CofS SHAPE
XO, CofS SHAPE
CIA, Dep in Bonn
AMEMB Bonn
Dep Cdr (Ops) 497 RTG
USMILREP to NATO, Intel
Planner
Dep Cdr, USAINSCOM
Honorary Col 502 Regt
Cdr, 3d AF
Cdr, 10 TRW
Cdr 48 TFW
Cdr, 20 TFW
Cdr, 81 TFW
3d AF, Dir of Ops

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DECEMBER

COL Robert M. Bowe
COL Walter L. Cressler
COL Robert W. Latourrette
MG William Charles
LTC Edward H. Cabaniss
LTC James F. Madison
Mr John C. Kornblum
Mr Mark Lissfelt
Mr Richard Smith
RADM James F. Dorsey
MG Roger A. Price

USAINSCOM/DCSOPS
DCofS USAINSCOM
57 FWW/AT
CofS Allied Tac AF
ODCSI USAREUR, CURINT
ODCSI USAREUR, CH Pdn Mgt
US Minister, Berlin
POLAD, Berlin
Pol/Mil Officer, Berlin
USEUCOM, J-3
DCOPS USAREUR

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B. (U) RELATIONS WITH GSFG/SERB (All paragraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated):

Meetings with Soviet Authorities: In 1985, 47 non-routine USMLM/SERB meetings took place. Many of these meetings were in connection with the USAREUR-GSFG staff negotiations to discuss measures to insure the safety and freedom of access of all Mission members in the aftermath of the Nicholson shooting. These meetings are mentioned below in chronological order; for additional substance, see Annex F following:

1. On 17 January at 1600 hours, CUSMLM delivered the following non-paper to COL Pereverzev, CSERB:

"The attention of the Soviet authorities is drawn to a recent violation of the airspace of the Federal Republic of Germany, the details of which have been established by the Federal German authorities and are being conveyed at the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, acting on behalf of the governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States of America.

At 1134 hours on December 25, 1984, two Soviet Mi-1 helicopters, one bearing the number '62', entered the airspace of the Federal Government of Germany northeast of the town of Tann in Hesse. They flew at an altitude of approximately 100 meters from the area of Goldhecke to Theobaldshof and returned toward the town of Andenhausen, thereby penetrating the airspace of the Federal Republic of Germany to a depth of approximately two kilometers before returning to GDR airspace.

The Soviet authorities are asked to take the steps necessary to avoid such incidents in the future."

Pereverzev, appearing annoyed, indicated in an off-hand manner that he would pass the protest to the competent authorities. In response to CUSMLM's comment that the investigation should be easier since a bort number had been reported Pereverzev quipped that if our sources were so good we should have reported both numbers.

CUSMLM then passed the following letter of protest concerning the closure of an Autobahn segment as part of a TRA:

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17 January 1986

Colonel Yu. Pereverzev
Chief, Soviet External Relations Branch
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

Dear Colonel Pereverzev,

I have closely examined the map of the temporary restricted areas which you presented to us yesterday. I was particularly dismayed to note your closing of a substantial portion of the E15, 22 Autobahn from 30 January through 6 February 1985.

This action is unprecedented and in my view totally unwarranted. Reversing the policy on open Autobahns cannot be justified as a measure to protect any on-going Soviet military activity. It is rather a flagrant infringement on the "complete freedom of travel" specified in Article 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. Denying USMLM access to E15, 22 Autobahn will effectively render the entire southeastern portion of the GDR inaccessible to my Mission.

I strongly protest the Autobahn closure and the blatant disregard for the provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement which its imposition reflects, and ask you to reconsider this arbitrary action.

Sincerely,

ROLAND LAJOIE
COLONEL, GS
Chief of Mission

COL Pereverzev responded in an obviously practiced manner (he had previously faced off with CBRIXMIS and CFMLM on this issue) that the restriction was in response to a month-long closure of a section of two FRG Autobahns by HQ, French Forces in Germany against the Soviet Mission in Baden-Baden. He pointed out that the Soviet response had been deliberately low key and non-escalatory in nature (one week compared to one month). In response to CUSMLM's query as to what the rationale was for taking action against USMLM, CSERB stated that applying the restriction against only one mission would be unnecessarily complicated. CUSMLM expressed skepticism about the difficulty in distinguishing among US, British, and French Mission plates and complained to Pereverzev about the shotgun approach the Soviets had selected. Pereverzev suggested that CUSMLM talk to the French.

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CUSMLM then inquired about a reply to CINCUSAREUR's letter of 14 December 1984 which had proposed a CINC-CINC meeting early in 1985. CSERB admitted with some embarrassment that GSFG was indeed remiss in not replying sooner and stated unofficially that prospects for a meeting were very good sometime in the Spring.

2. On 28 January, SERB responded to the autobahn closure protest as follows:

"In response to your letter number 1.24.85 dated 17 January 1985, I consider it my duty to advise you of the following:

The temporary closure of the segment of Autobahns 15, 22 to transit by members of foreign military liaison missions is a retaliatory measure for the closure to the members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission to CINC, French Forces in Germany of the segments of Autobahns number 3 and 48 for the period 14 December 1985 to 15 February 1985. I cannot agree with you that this necessary measure by CINC GSFG contradicts the Huebner-Malinin Agreement because in this case the segment of Autobahns E15, 22 is closed temporarily and for a significantly shorter period than the segment of Autobahns number 3 and 48 in the French Zone of the FRG.

Concerning transit to the open areas in the southeastern parts of the GDR, members of your Mission can utilize Autobahns E6 and 63.

In view of the above, I reject your protest as groundless and suggest that you take necessary measures to ensure that members of your Mission observe the boundaries of the temporary restricted areas.

I am also empowered to inform you that CINC GSFG, in the future, reserves the right to take appropriate retaliatory measures regarding foreign military liaison missions in instances of discriminatory actions against any Soviet military liaison mission located in the territory of the FRG.

Signed
COL YURI PEREVERZEV
Chief, SERB

3. On 1 Feb 85, CUSMLM, accompanied by one USMLM liaison officer, met with COL Pereverzev, CSERB, COL Medved', DC SERB, and a SERB translator, from 1730 to 1840 hours. At the meeting, held at his request, CSERB announced that GEN Zaytsev had accepted GEN Otis' proposal of 14 December 1985 for a meeting of the two CINCs in the near future and provided the following letter:

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

31 January 1985

No. 43

Dear General,

As Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany I accept with pleasure your proposal for a meeting between us.

For my part, such a meeting could take place in the second half of March 1985.

I believe it would be advisable to entrust the coordination of the specific details of the meeting to our Liaison Missions.

I am confident that this meeting will allow us to get to know each other better and serve as a basis for other contacts in the future when it is necessary to resolve questions of mutual interest.

Please accept, General, assurances of my highest respect.

Signed
M. ZAYTSEV
GENERAL ARMY

CSERB then passed the following letter, signed by himself, to CUSMLM:

No. 35

30 January 1985

Dear Colonel Lajoie,

Returning to the theme of my letter 450 of 17 August 1984, I must again call your attention to the continuing traffic violations by the members of your Mission.

Thus, just in the period 11 September to 29 November 1984, there were ten incidents of speeding by USMLM tour personnel (radar control evidence is attached).

In doing so, members of your Mission place their lives and those of other vehicle passengers in danger since as you know the majority of traffic accidents result from excessive speed.

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It must be noted also that members of the USMLM ignore traffic and other signs during their travels.

In particular, on 29 January 1985, the crew of Car #29 (Capt Hindrichs, Sergeant Kurtz) in the vicinity of the town of Dobeln (24 km southwest of Riesa), having passed through a local NO ENTRANCE sign, drove the wrong way down a one-way street.

This crude and irresponsible violation of the traffic laws led to an accident between the USMLM car and that of an East German citizen, which only by luck did not result in serious consequences.

I am obliged to pass to you the extreme concern of Headquarters GSFG concerning the constant violations of the posted traffic regulations in the GDR by USMLM members. I hope that you, as the Chief of Mission, will be able to take the necessary steps to prevent similar incidents so that we will not have to return to this problem again.

Respectfully,

signed
Yu. Pereverzev
Colonel
Chief, Dept of External
Relations of the Staff, GSFG

4. On 5 February, CUSMLM met with CSERB to inform him that GEN Otis had accepted "with pleasure" GEN Zaytsev's invitation to visit HQ GSFG at Zossen-Wuensdorf and to convey GEN Otis' preferences with regard to the visit: date of the visit 20, 22, or 18 March (in order of preference); a morning session followed by lunch, rather than afternoon/dinner; a relatively small delegation, and a schedule which provided for private talks between the two CINC's. COL Pereverzev asked about the possibility of attendance by a US Division or Corps Commander, with comparable GSFG representation and mentioned the possibility of a concert by a military band. After the conclusion of the discussions concerning the CINC-CINC meeting, Pereverzev read a non-paper complaining of the 31 January detention of a USMLM tour. While acknowledging that the tour was in an open area, he accused them of photographing military activity and of causing dangerous physical contact, albeit of a minimal nature, with a Soviet soldier during their attempt to evade detention. CUSMLM emphasized the illegal nature of the detention in an open area and the tour's absolutely correct behavior in the face of the unwarranted, improper detention.

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5. CUSMLM met with CSERB on 12 Feb in the latter's Potsdam office for further discussions concerning the proposed CINC-CINC meeting. CSERB indicated that 20 March was acceptable, with Friday, 22 March, as a back-up date. Information was exchanged concerning the size of the parties (six-seven officers in the US party - "considerably larger" on the Soviet side) and a tentative agenda, to include the following:

- Welcome at Zossen (1000 hours)
- Presentation of Honor Guard
- Playing of National Anthems
- Introduction of Soviet Delegation
- Private Talk Between CINCs
- Lunch
- Tour of Military Activity and Tactical Demonstration
- Visit to the GSFG Museum
- Concert
- Dinner
- Gift Exchange and Toasts
- Departure (1900 hours)

CUSMLM stressed GEN Otis' desire for a meaningful private conversation with GEN Zaytsev and suggested that the afternoon activity should be of interest from a professional military standpoint. COL Pereverzev responded in vague terms and repeated that everything was tentative.

6. On 26 February at 1100 hours, CUSMLM and CSERB met at the SERB Potsdam office to continue discussions concerning the upcoming CINC-CINC meeting. COL Pereverzev confirmed the 20 March date and apologized for his inability to provide additional specific agenda items. Arrangements for the gift exchange were discussed, as well as uniform requirements for the evening meal. Additional items for discussion included renovation of the small villa at the USMLM compound and two proposed GSFG-sponsored social events commemorating VE-Day:

- a. A concert and a museum tour in Wuensdorf, scheduled for sometime in April, to which all accredited Military Liaison Mission members and their families would be invited.

- b. A cocktail party and showing of the recently released Soviet film "Victory" at the Potsdam Officers' Club in early May for all accredited Mission members, followed by a dinner for Mission Chiefs and Deputies.

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Pereverzev asked for an early indication of USMLM intentions and stressed that this was a purely GSFG function, only for those Missions accredited to HG GSFG.

7. On 4 March, DCUSMLM delivered a non-paper protesting the Soviet helicopter violation of FRG airspace on 4 February to DCSEB, COL Medved'. After the protest was translated, COL Medved' promised to deliver it to HQ GSFG for action. He then, after prompting by the SEB interpreter, passed the GSFG response to a USAREUR protest of an earlier (25 December 1984) border violation. Text follows: "A thorough investigation was conducted by HQ GSFG regarding the notification by CINCUSAREUR of a violation of FRG air space by two Soviet Mi-8 helicopters in the vicinity of Tann (NB7211) (Land Hessen) which allegedly took place on 25 Dec 84. An analysis of flights and objective control data indicates that on 25 Dec 84 there were no flights by Soviet helicopters or any other aircraft in the area indicated. A violation of FRG airspace was not confirmed. Instructions for increased control over flights near the state borders of the GDR and FRG have been given to the appropriate agencies."

8. On 6 March at 1600 hours CUSMLM and DCUSMLM met with CSERB at the latter's request in the SEB Potsdam office. (Note: GEN Otis had that day delivered a letter to CSMLM-F cancelling the 20 March CINC-CINC meeting because he had been summoned to Washington for consultations.) Pursuant to CINCUSAREUR's instructions, CUSMLM assured CSERB that the cancellation was beyond GEN Otis' control and was in no way an indication of lessened interest on his part in a meeting at the earliest possible time. Expressing GEN Otis' satisfaction with coordination and planning to this point and his hope that this effort would be of use when the meeting did take place, CUSMLM extracted from COL Pereverzev the agenda which would have been followed:

0900	CINCUSAREUR and party cross Glienicke Bridge and transit to Wuensdorf in USMLM vehicles
1000	Honor Guard ceremonies and review
1010-1110	CINC's meet in private
1110-1200	Visit to "Combat Glory" Room in GSFG HQ followed by concert
1200-1400	Lunch followed by gift exchange and departure

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Pereverzev pointedly noted that CINCSFG had acceded to all CINCUSAREUR's desires:

Protocol visit, with reduced ancillary activities

Relatively short visit, skipping barracks and demonstrations

Plenty of time for conversations, with one hour reserved for private talks and two hours side-by-side at lunch

CSERB obviously deeply resented the cancellation and responded sharply to CUSMLM's suggestion that all the effort and planning to date would be useful for the new meeting. He indicated that settling on a new date would not be a simple matter, particularly in view of the upcoming VE-Day requirements.

9. On 13 March, Chief USMLM met with CSERB to deliver the CINCUSAREUR letter of condolence on the death of Secretary Chernenko. After formal expressions of sympathy, the conversation turned to other matters, to include the new GSFG PRA map.

Pereverzev stated that a new GSFG PRA map would be delivered "soon" and that it would result in a closure of Potsdam unless the situation of the Soviet missions in Frankfurt, Buende, and Baden-Baden was improved. CUSMLM reminded him that the restrictions imposed on the Soviet missions were in response to the GSFG map of May 1984 and cautioned that additional restrictions at this time could have very unfortunate results, further complicating this difficult issue. He underscored USAREUR's willingness to commence negotiations on the restricted area issue at any time and to return to reduced PRA levels on an equivalent basis.

10. On 19 March at 1600 hours, DCSERB passed CINCSFG's response to CINCUSAREUR's letter of condolence of 18 March. Text follows:

Dear General Otis,

Permit me on behalf of all GSFG personnel and myself personally to express gratitude for your condolences in connection with the demise of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR K. U. Chernenko.

Respectfully,

M. Zaytsev
General of the Army
Commander-in-Chief

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General Glenn K. Otis
CINC US Ground Forces
in Europe

On 24 March 1985 MAJ Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., a USMLM liaison officer, was shot and killed by a Soviet sentry at Ludwigslust GDR. A series of meetings between the Chief of Mission and his representatives and various GSFG officials, to include CSERB and the Chief of Staff, took place at the site of the killing, at the GSFG morgue, and at SERB offices. A CINC-to-CINC meeting on this incident also occurred in Potsdam on 12 April, followed eventually by three formal sessions of staff representatives of the two headquarters, each headed by a general officer. Including all related SERB-USMLM contacts, a total of 41 meetings were held in 1985 to discuss the Nicholson shooting. Exchanges were not confined to military channels, but included the highest levels of both governments. (See Annex F)

11. On 29 March CUSMLM and NAVREP met with C/S GSFG GEN-COL KRIVOSHEYEV at SERB HQ in Potsdam. This was the first meeting of the two sides since the shooting; it was a stormy session with the USMLM officers walking out of the meeting.

12. On 6 April at 1600 hours, CSERB delivered CINCGSFG's agreement to meet with CINCUSAREUR to discuss the Nicholson affair. Limited initial discussions between the two Chiefs concerning necessary arrangements took place.

13. On 11 April at 1125 hours, CUSMLM and the Naval Representative met with CSERB and two SERB officers. CSERB presented the GSFG response to the CofS USAREUR letter of 10 April.

14. On 11 April at 1755 hours, Chief USMLM delivered the 11 April CINCUSAREUR letter suggesting an immediate meeting with GEN Zaytsev to SERB. A 25-minute meeting, attended by GEN-MAJ Ye. I. Serov, Deputy CofS GSFG, CUSMLM, USMLM Naval Representative, CSERB, and two SERB translators, followed.

15. On 12 April at 1345 hours, CUSMLM met with GEN-MAJ Serov at SERB's Potsdam office to discuss the agenda for and mechanics of the CINC-CINC meeting for that day. That evening the two CINCs met in Potsdam, once at the Soviet Officers Club and once at the USMLM Potsdam House, to discuss the Nicholson killing and to establish areas for negotiation by their respective staffs.

16. On 30 April, LtCol Kelley, DCUSMLM, met with DCSERB, COL Medved' to discuss the 4 February violation of FRG airspace by a Soviet Mi-8 helicopter. DCSERB read and presented to DCUSMLM the following non-paper:

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"In reference to the assertion made by Chief, USMLM on behalf of CINCUSAREUR regarding the alleged FRG airspace violation by a Soviet Mi-8 helicopter in the vicinity of Philippsthal at 11:26 on 4 Feb 85, HQ, GSFG has conducted an investigation and a most careful analysis of flights during this period.

Two Mi-8 helicopters did, in fact, carry out flights at that time in the area specified. The flights were conducted in VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) at an altitude of 300-500 meters and at a distance of not less than 2 km from the intra-German border. No violation of the intra-German border occurred, which is confirmed by the results of objective monitoring.

Instructions have been given to the appropriate agencies to intensify their monitoring of aircraft flights conducted near the inter-German border."

Medved' then passed on SMLM-F grievances expressed some ten days prior by GEN-MAJ Shevtsov, Chief SMLM-F. Complaints included:

A. Permission no longer being granted for SMLM-F interzonal trips to Bonn, Baden, and Buende.

B. SMLM-F no longer able to have its vehicles serviced by a firm located in a PRA, even when escorted by MPs.

C. Quality of provisions furnished SMLM-F falling off.

DCSERB continued to the effect that GSFG did not normally support the concept of tit for tat and that no threat to restrict USMLM's access to and from West Berlin was even implied; however, some retaliation could take place for the restrictions placed on SMLM-F.

17. On 2 May at 1600 hours CUSMLM delivered to CSERB a letter from GEN Otis requesting clarification of the results of the 12 April meeting.

18. On 13 May CUSMLM received CINCSFG's response to CINCUSAREUR's letter of 1 May.

19. On 17 May at 1130 hours, CUSMLM delivered the CINCUSAREUR response to GEN Zaytsev's 13 May letter.

20. On 24 May CUSMLM and CSERB met at 1100 hours to discuss procedures for the upcoming USAREUR-GSFG staff negotiations.

21. On 29 May at 1100 hours, CUSMLM and CSERB continued the discussion concerning the negotiations begun on 24 May.

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22. On 31 May, CUSMLM delivered to CSERB a protest over a Soviet violation of FRG airspace which took place on 10 May. CSERB accepted the protest and promised to deliver it to his headquarters. He commented that, on the last such occasion, GEN-MAJ Meshcheryakov, Chief of Staff, AF GSFG, had conducted the inquiry and determined that no intrusion had taken place. Meshcheryakov had allegedly stated that low-level flights are so tightly controlled they 'might as well be on the Autobahns'. Accordingly, Pereverzev doubted that an investigation would reveal a violation in the present case.

23. On 31 May at 1630 hours, CUSMLM and CSERB met at SERB's Potsdam office to discuss the venue and rotation for the upcoming negotiations.

CSERB took the opportunity to raise another issue, accusing an unidentified USMLM tour of observing military activity through a hole in the fence at Krampnitz 261. Since no license plate number was acquired, Chief USMLM cast doubt on the accuracy of the report. CSERB made no attempt to pursue the matter.

24. On 4 June CUSMLM met with CSERB at the latter's request for further discussions concerning the venue for the staff negotiations.

25. On 06 June CUSMLM delivered to CSERB a memorandum from GEN Otis for GEN Zaytsev concerning the negotiations.

26. At Soviet request, CUSMLM met with CSERB on 11 June at 1100 hours for further discussions of arrangements for the staff negotiations.

27. On 12 June, DCUSMLM met with MAJ V. A. Chernykh, Soviet Governor of Spandau Prison and temporarily the senior officer at SERB-Potsdam to receive new information concerning the negotiations.

28. On 14 June, Round One of the USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations was held. The session lasted from 1000-1500 and occurred in the Terrace Officers Club in Frankfurt-am-Main.

29. On 20 June at 1530 CUSMLM met with CSERB to discuss a variety of issues relating to the staff negotiations.

30. On 1 July Round Two of the USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations was held. The session lasted from 1000-1500 and occurred in the Soviet Officers Club in Potsdam.

31. On 10 July at 1500 CUSMLM met with CSERB to receive the initial GSFG formulations for the negotiations' summary document and provide a reaction to them.

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32. On 15 July at 1130 hours Acting Chief USMLM met with CSERB to discuss as the first item the ramming of a US tour vehicle with consequent injuries to the Chief of Mission and serious damage to the vehicle. ACUSMLM delivered a statement which noted that: The unwarranted ramming was the source of great concern and indignation; such overreactions by GSFG personnel are typical and unacceptable; the succession of such incidents in the past months causes the US to question good faith of HQ GSFG; USMLM had done nothing to threaten GSFG personnel, facilities, or equipment; Soviet personnel involved in the ramming are those personnel specifically charged with enforcing traffic safety (VAI); the chase and ramming were totally unnecessary - detention of any tour can be accomplished at the Glienicke Bridge should it be suspected that a tour had engaged in unacceptable activity; serious political repercussions could result from this sort of behavior.

After attentively listening to the above, COL Pereverzev indicated that his headquarters regarded the incident very seriously, that the investigation had not yet been completed, but that, if the Soviet personnel proved to be at fault, they would be severely punished. He then mentioned a recent USMLM accident which GSFG had regarded with "understanding" and asked that USAREUR treat the ramming with a similar degree of understanding.

In response to a query as to the reported replacement of Generals Zaytsev and Lizichev, CSERB replied that he could not officially respond, but that GEN Zaytsev was still in command. Further information would be available on Wednesday. Both parties agreed to meet on Wednesday, 17 June, to discuss the negotiations procedural questions originally scheduled.

33. On 18 July at 1600 hours, ACUSMLM met with CSERB in the SERB Potsdam offices.

CSERB mentioned the press coverage of the ramming incident and stated that he did not relish the thought of talking frankly and openly and seeing his remarks spread over the Western press the next day. ACUSMLM assured him that his remarks are accorded strict confidentiality.

COL Pereverzev then stated that the GSFG investigating commission had determined that the Soviet troops had been completely responsible for the accident and that they would be severely punished for their actions.

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34. On 20 July, a SERB representative delivered the following letter to the USMLM Potsdam House:

HEADQUARTERS, GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY
EXTERNAL RELATIONS BRANCH

20 July 1985

Dear Lieutenant Colonel Kelley:

I have the honor to inform you that General of the Army Pyotr Georgivich Lushev has assumed the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, replacing General of the Army Mikhail Mitrofanovich Zaytsev, who has departed to another assignment.

Respectfully Yours,

signed
YU. PEREVERZEV
COLONEL
CHIEF, SERB
HQ, GSFG

35. On 24 July at 1530 hours CUSMLM met with CSERB in the SERB Potsdam offices. CSERB inquired as to CUSMLM's injuries, expressing astonishment that he should have sustained injuries to his eye, since normally he would have been thrown to the rear. COL Lajoie assured COL Pereverzev that it was not a self-inflicted wound and the conversation proceeded to other matters.

Pereverzev complained about Western media coverage of the previous day's Pentagon press conference, to include statements he had made in conversations with US representatives and which he had asked be treated as confidential. CUSMLM responded to the effect that Pereverzev's remarks were accurately reported, that the coverage had played down the significance of the incident and contributed to a lessening of tensions, and that Pereverzev was overreacting.

CUSMLM reported that US Command Berlin had investigated a GSFG protest concerning a 28 June incident near the Marienborn Checkpoint, had determined that US personnel had been guilty of improper conduct, and had disciplined the guilty parties. Pereverzev expressed his thanks.

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The conversation then turned to the renovation of the Potsdam compound. CSERB promised that a gas heating system would in fact be installed, although not before April 1986. Replacement of the roof would be accomplished, somewhat later than originally planned. It had proved necessary to dig an external settling tank as part of the new sewage system. As a result of these and other difficulties, the new target date for complete renovation of the large house was 1 April 1986 vice 1 January.

The conversation then turned to proposals surfaced during the ongoing staff negotiations.

CSERB then introduced a new concept for the revised PRA maps:

- A. The two sides exchange maps on a given date.
- B. No more than 25% of respective territories are to be in PRA.
- C. The cities in which the missions are located are to be completely open, with the exception of military facilities.
- D. No creation of de facto PRA.

36. On 26 July at 1000 hours, the USMLM Naval Representative delivered a Chief of Staff letter protesting the 13 July ramming to the DCSERB in the SERB Potsdam offices. A brief discussion centered on repairs to the USMLM Potsdam House followed.

37. On 29 July at 1000 hours, CUSMLM met with CSERB to discuss concluding formulations for the staff negotiations.

Two other items were subsequently addressed:

A. An inquiry as to whether GSFG should expect a CINCUSAREUR response to GEN Lushev's letter announcing his appointment as CINCGSFG.

B. CSERB indicated that there was considerable resentment on the part of GSFG headquarters concerning the tone and format of MG Fiala's 25 July letter protesting the ramming incident in which CUSMLM was injured and that very possibly his Chief of Staff would not respond, particularly since the offenders had already been severely punished.

38. On 2 August at 1500 hours, CUSMLM met with CSERB to discuss formulations for the staff negotiations. COL Pereverzev stated that GSFG's PRA map would be ready on or about 1 September 1985.

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39. On 8 August, CUSMLM met with COL Medved', ACSERB, to discuss amended formulations for the ongoing staff negotiations.

CUSMLM then informed COL Medved' that he had received a letter from GEN Otis congratulating GEN Lushev on his assumption of command (see para 37 above) and that he had been instructed to seek a personal audience with GEN Lushev to deliver the letter.

40. On 14 August from 1135 to 1205 hours, CUSMLM and ACSERB met to discuss proposals and amendments to the summary formulations for the staff-level negotiations.

41. On 15 August at 1000 hours, CUSMLM and DCUSLM met with the new CINCSFG, General of the Army Lushev, to deliver CINCUSAREUR's letter congratulating GEN Lushev on his appointment. GEN Krivosheyev, GSFG Chief of Staff, COL Medved' and LTC Tetyakov were also present. The meeting was formal but cordial, with Lushev himself expressing the normal sentiments: "Peace, tranquility, camaraderie between wartime allies." Subsequently, CINCSFG turned to personal matters, demonstrating that he had been thoroughly briefed on the backgrounds of the two USMLM officers.

A brief discussion of the Nicholson shooting led to the new CINC's comment that CUSMLM must ensure that his officers not put themselves in a position where a repetition could result. He emphasized the duties of a sentry on his post. When CUSMLM responded that the incident was avoidable and that the sentry had never given warning, GEN Krivosheyev made his only contribution to the conversation, asserting that SSG Schatz had not told the whole story to the US side.

Lushev contrasted the ease with which USMLM moved from one area to the other (Potsdam - West Berlin) with the problems SMLM-F encountered in travelling between his mission and the Soviet Embassy in Bonn.

The meeting ended at 1025 hours. In a marked change from audiences with previous CINCs, no alcohol was served. Whether this was the result of the new CINCSFG's personality or the Soviet anti-alcohol drive is unclear.

42. On 26 August, ACUSMLM met with ACSERB, COL Medved', in Potsdam between 1600 and 1635 hours. COL Medved' protested the presence of a USMLM tour in TRA 030-85. ACUSMLM responded that the tour had departed prior to the GSFG announcement of TRA imposition and that a second tour, dispatched specifically to find and inform them of the TRA, had been unable to locate them. LtCol Shoffner stressed that USMLM has no other means of communication with tours subsequent to

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their departure from the Mission House. Initially, Medved' appeared somewhat skeptical, but soon became somewhat more forthcoming. When ACUSMLM inquired whether the Soviets had attempted to stop the tour vehicle and advise USMLM personnel of the TRA, Medved' responded that no attempt had been made to halt them because of:

- A. The poor relations between the two headquarters.
- B. Desire not to risk an incident while the two staffs were negotiating.
- C. The Soviets' certainty that the tour would not have stopped in any event.

Medved' then alleged that USMLM crews had committed the following misdemeanors in the recent past:

- A. On 8 July, several violations of the Grossenhain PRA to a depth of 200 meters.
- B. On 12 July a 200 meter penetration of the Dresden PRA.
- C. On 18 July a violation of MRS in the Dresden area.
- D. On 27 July a series of unspecified violations of the "rules".

ACUSMLM replied to the effect that, while he had no specific information as to the alleged violations, he could categorically state that USMLM personnel never intentionally entered PRA. He could not rule out human error, but he assured ACSERB that no tour would knowingly and willfully remain in a restricted area.

COL Medved' appeared to accept this response, and the conversation turned to the status of the negotiations.

43. On 6 September at 1600 hours CUSMLM met with CSERB in the SERB Potsdam offices. The 50 minute working session was devoted to discussions of the latest Soviet proposals for the concluding document from the USAREUR-GSFG staff negotiations.

44. On 9 September at 1000 hours CUSMLM met with ACSERB to discuss the 7 September detention of a USMLM tour. ACSERB made an oral protest, alleging violation of MRS and reconnaissance of a military installation near Suhl. COL Lajoie presented COL Medved' the following letter:

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Colonel V.E. Medved'
Acting Chief, Soviet External Relations Branch
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

Dear Colonel Medved',

I must protest the detention of and treatment of LtCol Shoffner and MSgt Barry in USMLM Car 21 on 7 Sep 85 in the vicinity of Stutzerbach, GDR. The violent and threatening actions of the Soviet forces during this detention of an authorized tour in an open area cast doubt on GSFG's stated desire to avoid serious incidents involving MLM personnel. Permit me to point out the following:

1) A GAZ-66 truck (No. 96 15 EK) charged recklessly at, and struck a stopped and disabled USMLM tour vehicle. The Soviet truck inflicted significant physical damage on the tour vehicle because of the rash manner in which it was operated. Had the USMLM driver, MSgt Barry not quickly entered the USMLM vehicle upon seeing the approaching Soviet truck, he would unquestionably have been seriously injured.

2) At one point, a GSFG soldier held LtCol Shoffner at gunpoint and waved his weapon carelessly.

3) GSFG officers on the scene permitted extensive and unnecessary photography both by Soviet and East German personnel.

4) No Soviet Kommendant arrived on the scene to investigate the detention for six hours, despite the fact that it occurred at midday.

5) GSFG officers towed the disabled USMLM vehicle from the site of the detention to the location of a Mission Restriction Sign for the sole purpose of accomplishing allegedly incriminating photography.

All of these facts cause me great concern. HQ USAREUR will not fail to draw appropriate conclusions from the provocative behavior of the GSFG forces involved in this incident. Such behavior contradicts the assurances given by GSFG and undermines the atmosphere of trust which we all desire to restore.

I insist that GSFG take steps to halt such unrestrained acts and to reprimand those who commit them.

Sincerely,

ROLAND LAJOIE
Colonel, GS
Chief of Mission

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COL Medved' attempted to rebut the protest as follows: The driver of the GAZ-66 did not know that the tour vehicle was disabled and unintentionally (emphasis Medved's) struck the tour vehicle while attempting to get around it. The Soviet Kommendant arrived late because he had been informed only that a Soviet vehicle was involved in an accident, the third of the day, and he investigated the other two accidents before coming to the scene; the photographers were present to assist in the accident investigation. The armed soldier had no ammunition in his weapon; he was emphatically not there to threaten the tour, but to protect it, ensuring that no one attempted to make off with Mission property.

CUSMLM indicated his disbelief in and inability to accept Medved's rather ingenuous explanations.

45. On 11 September at 1100 hours CUSMLM and ACSERB met to discuss the latest in the list of proposals and counter-proposals resulting from the negotiations.

46. On 17 September, CUSMLM delivered to ACSERB a note verbale from USBER responding to a previous GSFG protest complaining of unauthorized traffic on the Glienicke Bridge. Text follows:

"The Glienicke Bridge, connecting Berlin and Potsdam, serves as a crossing point for authorized vehicles. The Allies take special care to ensure that the Berlin side of the bridge remains open at all times for such traffic. While the bridge is primarily used by MLM vehicles, it is occasionally used by others, including SERB vehicles and diplomatic vehicles of nations accredited to the GDR.

On the 29th of August, the camera truck of a local television station used the bridge as a platform in order to transmit directly to a nearby radio and television tower. Use of the bridge by such a vehicle was a very unusual occurrence and is not one that we expect to recur."

47. On 8 October, CUSMLM and ACSERB telephonically discussed progress of negotiations.

48. On 23 October at 1600 hours, CUSMLM met with CSERB to inquire about the status of the ongoing negotiations.

CSERB used the occasion to deliver a note verbale complaining about traffic accidents involving USMLM members. Further, he complained about the deleterious effect USAREUR's denial of interzonal travel to SMLM-F members was having on Soviet preparations for the 7 November celebrations. He indicated that

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CSMLM-F coordination on an ongoing basis with the Soviet ambassador in Bonn was vital to the success of the festivities and asked for USMLM's assistance in resolving the issue.

49. On 31 October at 1600 hours, ACUSMLM met with CSERB to discuss three recent defection attempts at the USMLM Potsdam residence. CSERB offered several recommendations to increase security, to include: increasing the height of the fence to at least two meters; mounting an L-shaped security grating atop the fence; and improving lakeside security. He requested input from USMLM on this subject.

50. On 14 November at 1100 hours, CUSMLM met with CSERB at the USMLM Potsdam residence. The following matters were addressed:

A. Continued the discussions of 31 October reference measures to be taken to enhance security at the Potsdam compound.

B. Made an inspection tour of the large villa to check progress of renovations. CSERB reaffirmed the 31 March 1986 completion date for the project.

C. Discussions as to steps which could be taken to refine and improve procedures for scheduling of the US Command Diesel.

D. COL Pereverzev suggested that a certain quid pro quo was in order: In exchange for the multiple entry/exit visas granted by the GDR (at Soviet urging) to West German contract employees involved in the renovation of the large villa, he suggested it would be appropriate for the Allies to permit two Soviet colonels who had business with both SMLM-F and SMLM-B to visit both missions without returning to the GDR between trips. CUSMLM promised to report this request to his headquarters, but warned CSERB that there was little basis for optimism.

E. Limited and inconclusive discussions took place regarding the lack of progress in the negotiations.

F. Pereverzev indicated that the new GSFG PRA map might be issued in November.

51. On 3 December starting at 1600 hours, CUSMLM and CSERB met to discuss the following matters:

A. USMLM Potsdam compound security measures.

B. Difficulties encountered in the renovation of the Potsdam House.

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- C. Administrative problems in USMLM-SERB correspondence.
 - D. US Command Diesel scheduling difficulties.
 - E. Detention of a SMLM-B vehicle on 27 November near the Eisenach crossing point.
 - F. Status of the Glienicke Bridge.
 - G. Formulations for the concluding statement of the USAREUR-GSFG staff discussions.
 - H. CSERB revised his stand with reference the issue date of the new GSFG PRA map, stating only that he hoped it would be published prior to the end of the year.
52. On 16 December at 1815 NAVREP met with DC SERB to receive a copy of the GSFG final position for the negotiations' summary document, which had been requested the day before.
53. On 27 December at 1700, CUSMLM met with CSERB to discuss arrangements for Round Three of the USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations, procedures to be employed, and substantive matters concerning the summary document.
54. On 30 December, Round Three of the USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations was held. The session lasted from 1200-1550 and occurred in the Soviet Officer's Club in Potsdam.

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PART IV LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (NOTE: All paragraphs and subparagraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated)

A. GENERAL

1. During 1985 the air conditioning system for the room housing the word processing equipment was installed and the voltage regulator installed in 1984 for the WANG equipment was made operational.

2. Large scale landscaping and security upgrades were proposed and approved pending funding. The proposed enhanced security measures include the construction of a new front gate and reinforcement of the rear (Clayallee) gate.

3. A minor construction order was placed for a covered vehicle storage area to house back-up Mercedes 280 GE tour vehicles.

4. The responsibility for logistical support provided to the USMLM Potsdam facility continues to rest with the Soviets. In that regard, the following standard support was provided:

a. Coal for heating, natural gas for stoves and electricity for lighting and appliances.

b. Gas coupons for travel in East Germany were delivered at the following times:

(1) 17 JAN - 6,000 liters

(2) 21 MAR - 6,000 liters

(3) 21 MAY - 6,000 liters

(4) 13 AUG - 8,400 liters

(5) 28 AUG - 3,000 liters

(6) 25 OCT - 3,000 liters

(6) 26 NOV - 6,000 liters

TOTAL: 38,400 liters

c. Rations delivered twice weekly, augmented by US funded commissary purchases in the form of condiments and frozen vegetables.

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- d. Trash removal twice weekly by the Soviets.
- e. East and West German telephone service, supplemented by a West German HF radio connection to USMLM Berlin.
- f. The entrance to the Potsdam compound is guarded by an East German policeman around the clock. A high security gate of Western design was proposed to the USCOB, but denied. The sentiment expressed was that the Soviets should provide this item. In conjunction with this, the Soviets propose to increase the height of the perimeter fence.

g. A household staff of 7 women and 3 men, paid by the Soviets, provides cooking, housekeeping, yard and building maintenance. The work week for these individuals was established this year at 40 hours to coincide with that provided SMLM-F.

5. Renovation of the boat dock was accomplished by a platoon from the 42d Engineer Company. These soldiers travelled to Potsdam in three US Army 5-ton trucks and stayed on the Potsdam House grounds for the duration of the project, a period of five days. Sand and gravel for the project were supplied by the Soviets.

6. Renovation of the caretaker residence (Nicholson Villa) was completed on schedule. However, problems soon developed regarding plumbing fixtures provided by the East Germans and with drainage in the basement. Additionally, it was discovered that a significant problem existed with the sewer system. The Soviet solution is to routinely pump the septic tank. Finally, the ladder providing access to the top floor was delivered by the East German contractor on 31 January 1986.

7. Renovation of the main house began as scheduled on 5 May. Problems soon developed concerning the work schedule and specific construction requirements. A system of regularly scheduled meetings was implemented so as to resolve these issues. The meetings were held every two weeks and involved the PDH OIC, Executive Officer, a DEH representative, a German speaking tour NCO as translator, the East German contractor from SPEZIALBAU Potsdam (Herr Kagel), a Soviet officer from either SERB or the GSFG equivalent of DEH (KECH), and a Soviet civilian from KECH. In general the renovation entailed complete replacement of all electrical wiring, plumbing and the promised installation of a natural gas heating system. The interior of the house was gutted (see photos following pages) and windows, doors and floors were replaced. The entire roof was replaced and all basement walls and floors were tiled or rebuilt. Equipment requiring quality of manufacture, such


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
as kitchen appliances and furnishings, is being supplied through Western sources. The US Army Berlin Department of Engineering and Housing has agreed to support USLM with these items. The Soviets continue to promise completion by 1 April 1986. (Specific information regarding the entire renovation project is held in the minutes recorded from each bi-monthly meeting.)



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B. (C) VEHICLES

1. Vehicle Status

a. As of 31 DEC 85:

- (1) One 1983 Ford Panel Truck
- (2) Two 1978 Opel Senators
- (3) One 1983 Volkswagen Kombi 9 Passenger Van
- (4) One 1984 Volkswagen Kombi 9 Passenger Van
- (5) One 1983 Mercedes 280 SE Sedan
- (6) Three 1984 Mercedes 280 SE Sedans
- (7) Two 1980 Mercedes 280 SE Sedans
- (8) One 1979 Mercedes 350 SE Sedan
- (9) Six 1981 Mercedes 280 GE 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Vehicles
- (10) Three 1983 Mercedes 280 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Vehicles
- (11) Three 1984 Mercedes 280 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Vehicles
- (12) Two 1985 Mercedes 280 GE 4-Wheel Drive 4-Door Vehicles

Total number of vehicles: 28

b. One 280 GE 4-door, two 280 GE 2-door, and three 420 SE sedans were ordered for delivery in May 1986.

2. Accreditations: USMLM currently is assigned ten vehicle accreditations, of which four are allocated to sedans, one to a Volkswagen 9 passenger van, one to a Mercedes 280 GE 4-door and four to Mercedes 280 GE 2-door vehicles.

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C. (C) PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY PRODUCTION STATISTICS (NOTE: All elements of this section classified CONFIDENTIAL):

<u>ROLLS OF FILM PROCESSED (35mm)</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1984</u>
Black and White (Original)	1904	1690
Color (Original and Dupe)	437	992
Duplicate Black and White	119	233
<u>PRINT PRODUCTION</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1984</u>
Proofs	31,329	33,061
Intelligence Report Prints	93,362	137,517
Other	11,867	-----
Total Prints	136,658	170,578

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ANNEX A HUEBNER - MALININ AGREEMENT

A G R E E M E N T

MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany", November 14, 1944, the US and the Soviet Commanders-in-Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadri-partite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.
2. Missions will be composed of air, navy, and army representatives. There will be no political representative.
3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.
4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission."
5. The Chief of the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

6. In the United States Zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.

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7. In the Soviet Zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.

8. In the United States Zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.

9. In the Soviet Zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior Officer of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in the Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of the Soviet or United States Mission wants to visit the United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories, and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24 - 72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and the headquarters of their respective Commander-in-Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communications through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they will also be given facilities such as mail, telephone, and telegraph through the existing means of communication when the members of the mission will be traveling within the zone. In case of breakdown in the radio installation the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communications.

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12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies, and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition, the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full rights of extra-territoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the missions will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in the Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by the Deputy Commanders of the United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

/s/ C. R. Huebner
/t/ Lieutenant General HUEBNER

Deputy Commander-in-Chief
European Command

/s/ Malinin
/t/ Colonel-General MALININ

Deputy Commander-in-Chief
Chief of Staff of the Group
of Soviet Occupational
Forces in Germany

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ANNEX B TOURING STATISTICS

A. (C) TOURS AND TOUR DAYS, 1985:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOURS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOUR DAYS</u>
January	40	83
February	45	102
March	28	60
April	33	53
May	35	77
June	42	89
July	41	83
August	44	84
September	42	89
October	46	106
November	37	71
December	39	71
TOTALS	472	967

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B. TOTAL DISTANCE, 1985: 444,579 km


C. COMPARISON, 1984 AND 1985:

	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>PERCENT CHANGE</u>
TOURS	519	472	-09
TOUR DAYS	1044	967	-07
DISTANCE	579,914 KM	444,579 KM	-23

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1985

PRESENT FOR DUTY, 31 DECEMBER 1985

COL	LAJOIE, ROLAND	USA
LTCOL	KELLEY, LAWRENCE G.	USMC
LTCOL	SHOFFNER, LARRY L.	USAF
MAJ	BLACK, ARTHUR N.	USAF
MAJ	BOHN, CHARLES J. III	USAF
MAJ	BORT, ROGER E.	USA
MAJ	ESCHRICH, JOHN E.	USA
MAJ	GROB, DAVID C.	USA
MAJ	JONES, RANDAL R.	USA
MAJ	LEAHY, JAMES V.	USA
MAJ	LYONS, RICHARD D.	USA
MAJ	MILTON, THEODORE R. JR.	USA
MAJ	SILVA, JAMES M.	USA
MAJ	WYCKOFF, THOMAS G.	USA
CPT	BERRY, JOHN H.	USA
CAPT	HINDRICHS, WERNER S.	USAF
CAPT	MCCUTCHEON, BENNETT B.	USAF
CMSGT	STAIDA, LARRY K.	USAF
MSG	YELL, CHARLES E. JR.	USA
MSGT	BARRY, CHARLES L.	USAF
MSGT	MOSES, THELTON L.	USAF

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1985 (CONTINUED)

SFC	SATORO, GREGORY C.	USA
SFC	TERENS, DENNIS P.	USA
SFC	TIFFANY, HANS-JOACHIM	USA
SSG	BENTON, JAMES F.	USA
SSG	BLAKE, RONALD H.	USA
SSG	BOONE, DAVE A.	USA
TSGT	CHANDLEE, MICHAEL J.	USAF
SSG	DAVIS, EBYLEE	USA
SSG	EAIRHEART, STEVE J.	USA
SSG	EVERETT, RANDY B.	USA
SSG	LAWRENCE, GARY L.	USA
SSG	MCDOWALL, JAMES H.	USA
SSG	MCMULLEN, W. L.	USA
SSG	SCHATZ, JESSIE G.	USA
SSG	SCHWAB, LAWRENCE R.	USA
SSG	THOMPSON, ROBERT A.	USA
SGT	CLEMMONS, STEPHEN T.	USA
SSGT	CUSHMAN, MARK T.	USAF
SSGT	FLOURNOY, KATHERIN D.	USAF
SGT	JOHNSON, EDWARD E. JR.	USA
SGT	KENNEDY, DAVID J.	USA
SGT	KNIGHT, WILLIAM J.	USA

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1985 (CONTINUED)

SGT	LAMPKIN, ELAINE L.	USA
SGT	MCKINNON, SAMUEL A.	USA
SGT	PECHULIS, MICHAEL I.	USA
SSGT	SCHAFFNER JAMES W.	USAF
SGT	WHEELER, KEITH G.	USA
SGT	WIERMAN, LEONARD P. JR	USA
SP4	ALLEY, WADE P.	USA
SP4	DIAL, LARRY D.	USA
SP4	FONVILLE, KEITH D.	USA
SP4	JONES, ROBERT L.	USA
SGT	KURTZ, DARRELL L.	USAF
SP4	LEINENWEVER, CHRIS	USA
SP4	OSTRANDER, SETH E. IV	USA
SP4	WESSELING, PAULA M.	USA
SP4	WILLIAMS, DANIEL L.	USA
MR	BATES, JAMES	CIV
MR	CORBETT, WILLIAM R.	CIV
MR	HANDY, MARK A.	CIV
MR	HOYT, STEPHEN V.	CIV
MRS	JOHNSON, SHEILA	CIV
MS	SEMMETT, EDA SUZANNE	CIV
MR	SEXTON, JEFFREY	CIV
MRS	SEYMOUR, DIANE L.	CIV

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1985 (CONTINUED)

DEPARTURES 1985

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DEPARTURE DATE</u>
SP5	TYSON, DAVID K.	27 FEB 85
SP4	CASSIDY, PATRICK S.	23 APR 85
LTCOL	BOYETTE, PAUL A.	1 MAY 85
SP5	JOHNSON, CHARLES D.	2 MAY 85
SSG	JOHNSTON, JON E.W.	11 MAY 85
SFC	MINTZ, ROBERT J.	30 MAY 85
MAJ	WISE, ROBERT W.	29 JUN 85
MAJ	NELSON, PAUL H.	1 JUL 85
SGT	SMITH, CHARLES E. II	9 JUL 85
CAPT	CROXALL, GARY L.	18 JUL 85
CAPT	GALLAGHER, EDWARD A.	25 JUL 85
LTC	PETERS, MICHAEL P.	28 JUL 85
TSGT	FRIDGE, CARL E.	25 SEP 85
TSGT	BENICKEN, JOHN A.	25 OCT 85
SSG	TABARANI, LISA J.	24 MAR 85
MRS	BANKS, BENNIE B.	14 JUN 85
MR	FEHR, STUART L.	11 MAY 85
MS	FUCHS, LINDA C.	29 NOV 85
MS	QUINONES, CECILIA M.	16 DEC 85

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AANNEX D DEALINGS WITH SERB, STATISTICS

(C) A Unit History is often of use to the originating unit as an internal record of background information and precedent affecting current operations. This Annex has as its purpose the provision of just such an internal record of USMLM-SERB transactions for the period 1980-1985. Included are: total annual guest pass requests and total annual requests for accreditation changes for personnel and for vehicles.

A. GUEST PASS REQUESTS:

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
JANUARY	3	23	48	24	100 (22)	77 (26)
FEBRUARY	41	42	39	30	56 (20)	65 (17)
MARCH	53	58	82	34	54 (37)	76 (24)
APRIL	118	85	104	93	142 (36)	216 (43)
MAY	33	42	43	17	128 (39)	126 (29)
JUNE	500	106	314	345	495 (58)	72 (20)
JULY	56	362	50	36	115 (26)	113 (27)
AUGUST	68	72	40	62	116 (35)	124 (32)
SEPTEMBER	60	22	25	38	103 (29)	85 (33)
OCTOBER	29	39	37	51	97 (24)	107 (33)
NOVEMBER	126	72	93	140	134 (34)	97 (34)
DECEMBER	69	16	61	119	120 (28)	115 (32)
TOTAL	1056	900	926	949	1660(388)	1283(350)

NOTE: Parenthetical entries for 1984 and 1985 are the number of guest pass requests submitted to SERB.

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B. PASS EXCHANGES

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
JANUARY	14	14	12	15	23	11
FEBRUARY	20	15	19	13	26	10
MARCH	16	11	13	19	18	9
APRIL	16	11	10	12	18	13
MAY	20	14	10	17	22	10
JUNE	8	16	12	21	16	10
JULY	16	20	13	16	12	8
AUGUST	17	17	20	25	12	11
SEPTEMBER	8	13	13	21	10	10
OCTOBER	11	10	14	20	10	11
NOVEMBER	12	15	17	21	11	12
DECEMBER	12	13	18	25	13	16
TOTAL	165	179	171	225	191	131

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C. VEHICLE EXCHANGES

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
JANUARY		1				
FEBRUARY		2	2			
MARCH						
APRIL						
MAY						
JUNE	1			1		
JULY	2		1			
AUGUST						
SEPTEMBER	1					
OCTOBER	1	2				
NOVEMBER		2	1			
DECEMBER	1	1				1
TOTAL	6	6	4	1	0	1

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ANNEX E REDESIGNATION OF AIR TEAM, USMLM

(C) On 1 November 1985, the Air Team, long a detachment of United States Air Forces in Europe's Collection Directorate, finally received its own identity. The 7542d Special Activities Squadron celebrated its coming-out party on 1 November, with well-wishers and guests representing HQ USAFE, United States Commander Berlin, and the Army and Navy elements of USMLM. Organizationally, the new squadron reports directly to the HQ USAFE, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, but remains under the operational control of Chief, USMLM. With 14 personnel currently assigned, the Air Team is one of the smallest squadrons in the entire Air Force. The Air Team will continue its 38-year tradition of championing USAF interests within the overall collection and liaison mission of USMLM.



Sir, I assume command of the 7452d Special Activities Squadron.

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The "Old Man" cuts the cake.



The new squadron forms up.

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ANNEX F NICHOLSON SHOOTING NEGOTIATIONS

NOTE: All succeeding sub-paragraphs classified CONFIDENTIAL.

The shooting death of MAJ Arthur D. "Nick" Nicholson, Jr. USA on 24 March 1985 initiated the most emotionally turbulent, politically supercharged, and operationally deleterious era in the history of USMLM. MAJ Nicholson's loss represented a tragedy which USMLM had managed to avert, sometimes slimly, over nearly 38 years of its existence. It forced the unit to share with FMLM the onerous burden of conscience which always attends the loss of a comrade in defense of his country. It consolidated the MLMs in their grief and strengthened their spiritual bonds in ways that no other event could. In a political sense, it prompted a crisis which pitted the Allies -- united to a degree rarely encountered -- against GSFG, and Washington against Moscow. In the operational realm it fettered collection for a period that even today has not ended. In short, the shooting touched every fiber of USMLM's existence.

The shooting also forced shifts in our manner of thinking and operating. The danger inherent in collection, while always a matter of latent awareness for tour personnel, came to the forefront of both national and Mission consciousness. It also became, for a protracted period, a subject of intense interest in the minds of the national and theater command authorities. Through his ingrained reaction a faceless Soviet sentry in Ludwigslust forced a superpower showdown, ushered the AMLMs from the shadows into the glare of public scrutiny, and compelled their tour personnel to fundamentally reconsider the premises of their risk-gain calculus. The sentry also catapulted USMLM willy-nilly into a complex political arena inhabited by military and diplomatic actors on a number of levels. It would be difficult to overstate the consequences of his act.

The Mission survived the Nicholson period intact and with somewhat enhanced operational capabilities. Certainly USMLM demonstrated the resiliency, breadth of ability, inner strength, and professional competence which only a hand-picked organization can muster; the policy of selectivity proved its merit. A forthcoming new PRA map, which over time became intimately linked with the Nicholson incident, promises to eliminate the most burdensome features of an earlier PRA regime and provide access to tracts closed to the Missions for decades. The Soviets have agreed to issue MLM information cards to their troops, which should improve the security of Mission personnel at the margin by sowing doubt into the mind of 19-year old Soviet sentries about their legal obligations. GSFG has also committed itself to brief its soldiers regularly about MLM tours; there is little question but that Moscow

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wants no repetition of such incidents. Still, the command will not change its procedures fundamentally regardless of circumstances. For, as we all appreciate, the security of the state enjoys essentially absolute value in the USSR.

THE CONTEXT

In the early spring of 1985 there were indications of a thaw in US-Soviet relations that could be perceived within USAREUR as well as at the national level. For the first time since the Soviets' 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, USMLM received authorization to attend the annual Soviet Army-Navy Day reception in Potsdam in force rather than with token representation; GSFG greeted the decision with scarcely concealed glee. And in a move of consummate irony USAREUR had scheduled -- and USMLM orchestrated with SERB -- the first visit by its CINC to HQGSFG since 1977. Only last minute exigencies forced USAREUR to cancel the visit; it would have taken place a scant four days before the shooting.

Thus, as MAJ Nicholson departed the Potsdam USMLM compound with SSG Jessie G. Schatz for the northwest GDR on a sunny Sunday morning in March, one could not avoid a sense of optimism toward dealings with the Soviets. No operational grounds existed for anxiety, and the prospects for collection seemed fair. A qualified, extremely experienced crew on a routine tour reconnoitering standard targets during an off-day should have encountered nothing more menacing than boredom. Instead, tragedy struck.

THE SHOOTING AND ITS AFTERMATH

MAJ Nicholson was shot at 1545A outside tank sheds located on Ludwigslust Subcaliber Range 475 (PE675081), where he had dismounted from the tour vehicle to check for the possible presence of armored vehicles. This facility served the Independent Tank Regiment of 2 Guards Tank Army. Known to be frequently guarded under normal conditions, it had a varied history of occasionally violent reaction. Thus, the tour had entered the area with considerable caution, stopping in the forest to watch and listen at intervals as they did so. SSG Schatz, who had just visited the site a few days prior pointed out an area which had been recently occupied, but the Soviets had departed it. The tour then approached the sheds, photographed signboards displayed nearby, and positioned the vehicle to permit the tour NCO to pull security while the tour officer checked for armor.

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Unbeknownst to the tour, and despite its best efforts at observation, a sentry remained undetected, concealed in the adjacent woods. According to information obtained later, he had been walking his post on the far side of the sheds as the tour approached. Hearing the vehicle, the Soviet soldier made his way through the woods on the flank of the range to a position about 50 meters behind the tour; SSG Schatz noticed him just before he opened fire. The Soviets claim that the sentry issued a challenge in two languages (Russian and German), fired a warning shot into the air, then shot to disable. This is simply not true. SSG Schatz, a native German, heard no challenge in any language. The sentry's first shot whizzed narrowly over the heads of the tour; it was not a warning, but a miss. And one of the two remaining rounds struck MAJ Nicholson, by this time running back to the tour vehicle, near his center of mass: the upper abdomen. SSG Schatz shouted a warning as the first shot resounded -- too late to help. He then slammed the hatch shut, started the car, and threw it into reverse to reach MAJ Nicholson. Hit by one of the shots, Nicholson groaned, fell, called to Schatz, and promptly lost consciousness. The tour NCO sprang from the vehicle to administer first aid, but the sentry refused to permit him to do so. Using sign language, SSG Schatz communicated his intent to the Soviet and took a step toward the fallen officer. The sentry, who had held Schatz at gunpoint the entire time, then shouldered his AK-74, took aim at Schatz's head, and motioned him back into the vehicle. Seeing the futility of further action and the hopelessness of the situation, SSG Schatz complied. He secured and covered the tour equipment, checked to be sure the doors were locked, and waited. Shock set in quickly.

The sentry reported his action by telephone immediately, specifically mentioning "Missiya" (Mission), and a contingent of armed troops arrived within minutes. Over the next three hours many Soviet officers and soldiers arrived to secure the area, collect data, and investigate the situation; considerable confusion reigned. Yet no one, including the obvious medical personnel, rendered even rudimentary first aid. Finally at 1650A (one hour, 5 minutes after the shooting) an unidentified individual in a blue jogging suit took MAJ Nicholson's pulse, which had ceased. The protracted failure to provide or permit any medical attention at all ensured that the wound proved fatal. In the final analysis it was this culpable negligence more than any other single factor which the US Government stressed in its protests, and the charge evoked tremendous Soviet ire.

It was 1807A before MAJ V. A. Chernykh of SERB-Potsdam notified USMLM of an "accident involving USMLM vehicle 23". COL Yu. V. Pereverzev, CSERB, requested the immediate presence of CUSMLM at the site. However, the location was not stated; Chernykh apparently

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believed that the Mission had acquired that information via its own channels. An hour of frenzied inquiry ensued before he finally revealed the approximate location of the "accident".

At 1938A COL Roland Lajoie USA (CUSMLM), LtCol L. G. Kelley USMC (NavRep), and SSG R. B. Everett USA (Tour NCO) departed at high speed for Ludwigslust. Arriving two hours later, the group entered an eerie atmosphere of numbing, subdued formality. Led by a Soviet UAZ-469 for the final few kilometers of the journey, it encountered a random group of roughly 50 Soviet officers -- most of them relatively senior -- clustered under the glare of vehicle headlights on the sub-caliber range. It was only then and under the direct questioning of CUSMLM that an unidentified colonel very reluctantly revealed that MAJ Nicholson had been killed. The principals on the scene, GEN-COL G. F. Krivosheyev (C/S, GSFG) and CSERB, were absent; they returned to the range shortly afterwards.

One would have expected expressions of remorse and condolence, but despite the magnitude of the sentry's actions and their traumatic implications on the personal and political planes, C/S GSFG immediately directed an impassioned protest at CUSMLM, accusing him of personally sabotaging relations between the commands and placing all responsibility for the outcome squarely on his shoulders. Krivosheyev appeared awkward, uncertain, aggressive, and cold; he required considerable prompting from an unidentified GEN-MAJ. USMLM had noted his limited mental capacity on previous occasions, and the trend continued. C/S GSFG then transferred direction of the proceedings to the Deputy Procurator for GSFG, COL V. P. Mel'nichuk. The latter arrogantly and obstinately ordered that CUSMLM witness an inventory of Nicholson's belongings, direct SSG Schatz to submit to interrogation, and permit an interior inspection of the tour vehicle. He threatened to have Schatz incarcerated and subjected to interrogation without US presence, should COL Lajoie refuse. Further, he stated that Nicholson's body would undergo an autopsy at a Soviet medical facility the following morning, which an American observer could witness. Not surprisingly, the atmosphere quickly became acrimonious and agitated. The Soviets threatened CUSMLM and NavRep with personal consequences in response to their barbed depiction of the proceedings and refusal to acquiesce. CUSMLM insisted that Schatz be accorded the rights guaranteed under US law during questioning; Mel'nichuk refused, citing Soviet jurisdiction. Heated argumentation followed, and the hours dragged on. Ultimately, with some intercession by CSERB, CUSMLM elicited the right for Schatz to refuse to answer questions which he considered inappropriate. The Soviets then began their interrogation. Schatz invoked this right the moment the queries became substantive, which prompted a vitriolic retort from Mel'nichuk toward CUSMLM; however, the ploy had ensured Schatz's freedom. The tour car remained inviolate.

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At nearly midnight, CUSMLM struck an agreement with CSERB that the USMLM party could depart in both its vehicles. NavRep, however, would escort MAJ Nicholson's body -- in Soviet custody -- back to a medical laboratory in Potsdam, where forensic specialists planned to perform an autopsy as part of the legal investigation directed by Mel'nichuk. The US vehicles left for the nearest Autobahn, and CUSMLM informed the Potsdam House OIC MAJ J. M. Silva USA of the events while enroute home. Silva, in turn, relayed the information to Berlin, where USMLM notified the chain of command. With SSG Schatz's commentary the Mission possessed an accurate picture of what had transpired; his distraught story evoked concurrent sympathy and revulsion. But yet another traumatizing experience, the notification of next of kin, remained to be accomplished before this dismal evening could be concluded.

At approximately 0230A on Monday morning, 25 March, CUSMLM, accompanied by Nicholson's close friends MAJ J. E. Eschrich (Ground Operations Officer), MAJ T. G. Wyckoff (Tour Officer), their wives, and LTC (Rev) W. A. McAllister, presented the sorrowful news to Nicholson's wife Karen and daughter Jenny. This exercise in consolation marked the beginning of a long and comprehensive effort by USMLM, US Army Berlin, and the entire Army chain of command to ensure the welfare of the Nicholson family; Majors Eschrich, Wyckoff, P. A. Nelson, and T. R. Milton, Jr made tireless contributions in this regard. The provision of a support network assumed the utmost importance to officers at every level, and through their generosity and active benevolence the Nicholson family weathered the gale of loss with considerably less pain. These efforts continue today, a full year after the shooting.

In Potsdam the disorder which had characterized the scene at Ludwigslust continued unabated. Extensive waiting, unexpected arrivals, and uncertain planning became the norm. CUSMLM issued and relayed to NavRep the order -- reflecting the Nicholson family's wishes and USAREUR's instructions -- not to permit an autopsy. By battling the GSFG procurator and interceding with others on the Soviet side he succeeded in preventing one, although Mel'nichuk attempted on multiple occasions to exclude NavRep and win US acquiescence via pressure. Finally, in mid-afternoon the procurator conceded that GSFG would insist only on X-rays and an external examination of the body and uniform. MAJ (Dr) M. A. Morgenstern USA, the Berlin MEDDAC physician designated to officially observe the forensic proceedings, had encountered a four-hour delay on the Glienicke Bridge before the Soviets would authorize him to cross. Once he arrived at the laboratory, Mel'nichuk deprived him of his tape recorder, thus further hindering the performance of his

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professional duties. However, despite his far from benign reception by Soviet officials, the somewhat primitive and insensitive medical procedures employed, and brazen retention of pieces of Nicholson's uniform in defiance of repeatedly articulated US demands, Dr. Morgenstern and NavRep compelled the Soviets to respect the dignity of the body. SERB returned the missing uniform articles later that night.

The US party (NavRep, Dr. Morgenstern, MAJ R. A. Wise, SSG Everett) escorted MAJ Nicholson on his final crossing of the Glienicke Bridge at 1715A. Under the attentive gaze and before whirring cameras of a legion of media correspondents, and in the center of the Allied section of the bridge, CUSMLM draped MAJ Nicholson's body with the Stars and Stripes. The Berlin Brigade Honor Guard, dispatched at the personal direction of Brigade Commander BG(P) Thomas A. Griffin USA, rendered a final salute to the fallen tour officer, and the short motorcade sped off.

By this time word of the shooting had flashed across the world, and the media focused attention on the AMLMs, their activities, reputation, and the detail of the shooting. Inevitably, they reported many inaccuracies as truth. The MLMs, which had long flourished in the grey half-light of obscurity, became objects of stylish notoriety and far too fixed attention; they suffered for it. Expressions of indignation accompanied the reporting, and the country lived through a wave of patriotic zeal and sense of wronged innocence that exceeded even our own; the emotion often belied the facts.

On the evening of 25 March the three AMLMs, US Army-Berlin, and the major commands in the American military community bid MAJ Nicholson farewell at Tempelhof Central airport. To the accompaniment of the Berlin Brigade Band's subdued "Abide with Me" the Honor Guard placed his casket on a waiting aircraft and dispatched it through the somber night to Frankfurt, where a USAREUR honor guard headed by MAJ GEN C. J. Faila, Chief of Staff USAREUR, waited. As with the ceremonies on the Brigade, the media dutifully recorded both ends of MAJ Nicholson's journey toward his final resting place. The scene deeply touched a mourning country.

As more and more information came to light, CUSMLM filled in its picture of the events, reported it, and plotted a course of action. USAREUR dispatched a senior officer to conduct the command's formal investigation of the shooting, and he solicited detailed statements from those involved. Throughout this trying period HQ US Army Berlin and HQ USAREUR remained totally supportive of USMLM's positions and ready to provide assistance whenever asked. LTC M. P. Peters USA (Chief of Ground) interrupted a trip to CONUS and

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stationed himself in Heidelberg to provide firsthand knowledge of USMLM's procedures/operations; his assistance proved invaluable. And MAJ R. D. Lyons, USA (Tour Officer), who had escorted MAJ Nicholson's body to Frankfurt, remained in place to perform a variety of personal and professional services attendant to the situation. HQUSAREUR composed a sharply worded protest letter which GEN Glenn K. Otis, CINCUSAREUR, signed and sent via USMLM to CINCSFG. Additionally, MG C. J. Fiala summoned COL Pankratov (acting Chief of SMLM/F) to lodge a similar formal protest. The news seemed to take the SMLM/F representative by surprise; incredibly, he appeared not to have been fully informed! On 28 March the Berlin community paid tribute to MAJ Nicholson in a moving multinational service at the American Community Chapel. The memorialization integrated British and French military honors with American themes to symbolically express the solidarity always felt by the three Missions.

On 29 March, in an effort coordinated among the Allied headquarters, the three chiefs of mission all demanded appointments with General of the Army Mikhail M. Zaytsev, CINCSFG, to deliver official protests. Claiming that circumstances beyond his control prevented his attendance, he sent his Chief of Staff to receive them in Potsdam. Thus, Krivosheyev, who had displayed such callous insensitivity at Ludwigslust, became the target of a planned and purposeful barrage. All of the chiefs carried caustic letters from their CINCs condemning the shooting ("a wanton act of violence", "uncivilized behavior") and stressing the aspects of it which angered the Soviets most, in particular GSFG's refusal to permit or administer first aid.

USMLM had the first appointment of the morning, followed by FMLM and BRIXMIS. The session, attended by CUSMLM and NavRep, quickly became intense and heated, as expected. Anticipating preemption, countercharge, and obfuscation -- which so typify Soviet behavior on the defensive -- USMLM had developed a plan by which to avert them. Krivosheyev attempted to dominate the conversation, but CUSMLM repeatedly interrupted him to take command. In a near rage at the telling points which had been made, Krivosheyev -- who speaks no English -- refused to let his translator translate, replying haphazardly to points perceived but not made. CUSMLM alternated between English and Russian, parrying Soviet blows immediately, while Krivosheyev lashed out disconcertedly at what he thought might have been charged. The performance was less than convincing, to which the shaken expression on CSERB's face quickly attested. Having given Krivosheyev several opportunities to express regret for the actions of his sentry, each time without effect, CUSMLM asked him point blank whether GSFG felt any remorse at all over the incident. The latter replied emphatically in the negative. At this, CUSMLM

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and NavRep rose and, cutting Krivosheyev off in mid-sentence, left. The insult shocked the Soviets. When the Chiefs of FMLM and BRIXMIS arrived at their respective times to deliver protests, they found C/S GSFG unavailable. It was said meekly that he had left in haste for Wuensdorf, and they were compelled to leave their letters with the translator -- the only SERB officer who could be found!

Immediately following delivery of the protest CUSMLM and NavRep boarded a helicopter which was standing by at Glienicke Bridge for the brief flight to TCA, where a C-12 was waiting to take them to Frankfurt. In Frankfurt they joined the Nicholson family and a 14-man USMLM contingent reinforced by BRIXMIS and FMLM representation and departed for Washington, accompanying MAJ Nicholson's body for burial. The nine-hour C-141 flight from Rhein-Main AB terminated on the tarmac of Andrews AFB, where Vice President George Bush, Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force Generals John A. Wickham and Charles A. Gabriel, and a variety of other dignitaries met the party. The Vice President made brief but blunt remarks which sent an unambiguous message of disapproval to the Kremlin. An unofficial organization of USMLM alumni and friends congregated to provide massed attendance; their support at the activities of the following days and enduring loyalty impressed all concerned.

The nation laid its fallen son to rest with full military honors and conspicuous dignity on Saturday, 30 March. As the networks watched vigilantly, a horse-drawn caisson from the Old Guard bore MAJ Nicholson on this overcast morning from the chapel at Fort Myer along verdant, tree-lined pathways to his final posting in Arlington National Cemetery. With the band playing muted strains from "The Navy Hymn" and "America the Beautiful", his family, friends, and USMLM alumni -- those who had shared his successes and danger -- bade MAJ Nicholson a final farewell. A grateful country awarded him the Legion of Merit and Purple Heart before laying him to rest. One chapter in the Nicholson saga had come to a close, but another was about to begin.

IN THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

In the wake of the Nicholson shooting USMLM curtailed operations; it continued showing the flag in the GDR but risked little more. This virtual moratorium on collection remained in place for about two weeks, then gave way to circumscribed touring with extensive restrictions, as authorities grappled with the problem of how best to reenter the environment. The answer to that question became

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inextricably linked to a larger one: how to respond to the shooting at all?

The positions of the two governments on the shooting took shape within a week. President Reagan's characterization of the incident as "murder" found its echo in most official pronouncements. Secretary Weinberger released a public statement demanding that Moscow render apology and pay compensation to the Nicholson family. Advised repeatedly that the Soviets would not accede to such demands -- they had made no such gestures after the KAL shootdown -- the Secretary nonetheless remained adamant and pressed his case at every opportunity.

The Soviets, for their part, immediately took to the offensive. News of the shooting had hardly arrived in Washington before Oleg M. Sokolov, DCM at the Soviet Embassy, delivered a "resolute protest" even the "illegal actions of members of USMLM". It alleged espionage, the clandestine penetration of a restricted facility, and "gross violation of...the Huebner-Malinin Agreement". Several days later Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin met with Secretary of State George Shultz on the incident. They agreed that CINCSFG and CINCUSAREUR should meet for a joint discussion of relevant issues. TASS clarified Soviet positions in an article on 28 March ("On the Incident Involving the American Serviceman"): "The tragic outcome of the 24 March incident is regrettable; however, responsibility for it lies entirely with the American side, which is currently spreading a patently false version of events." Thus, notwithstanding the expressed desire of the two governments "not to unnecessarily complicate relations", their respective positions put them at loggerheads.

The body charged with developing an appropriate response to the Nicholson shooting was the Interagency Group (IG). Chaired by the State Department, the IG has representation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and other foreign policy principals. CUSMLM was given an opportunity to participate in the initial meeting of this group and also briefed its various representatives individually. The IG authorized an early CINC-to-CINC meeting and endorsed the need to prevent such incidents while not crippling USMLM's intelligence capability.

The two Congressional intelligence oversight committees expressed particular interest in the Nicholson incident, and they too requested briefings. On 2 April CUSMLM, supported by former tour officer LTG William Odom (then ACSI DA) and MG Julius Parker USA (DIA), testified before the House Permanent Select Committee on

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Intelligence. The following day NavRep performed similar service before the staff of the Senate Committee on Intelligence. The presentations generally evoked staunch support and kindled indignation in the audience, although some few Congressmen also expressed concern about Mission activities.

The USMLM contingent returned to Europe in early April on an inspired note. In the first of a series of memorial dedications in MAJ Nicholson's honor Army Secretary Marsh presided over a tree planting ceremony at Fort Belvoir. The lush, placid countryside of Nicholson's first duty station served as a fitting backdrop for the eloquent remarks delivered by the Secretary and LTG Odom. But in the years to come those who were present will recall not the elegance of their crafted prose but rather the simplicity of Karen's widely quoted summation: "Nick did not want to die, and we did not want to lose him. But I know that he would lay down his life again for America."

CINC-TO-CINC

Both sides agreed on the need for the respective commanders-in-chief to meet, but each had its own reasons for doing so, and they did not coincide. GSFG desired the meeting "to completely close the incident" and follow through on the governmental decision relayed by Dobrynin. In Moscow's view conduct of the meeting would, ipso facto, indicate closure of the matter, regardless of outcome. USAREUR, on the other hand, needed the encounter to deliver a broadside. Far from closing the incident, the US desired to hold it open and force sweeping changes in the operating procedures of GSFG. It hoped to win Western-style guarantees of safety from a reluctant Soviet commander and, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, solicit a pledge of apology and compensation.

On 6 April CSERB summoned CUSMLM to present a non-paper proposing that the CINCs meet to implement their governments' decision. He suggested Wuensdorf or the Potsdam Officers' Club as the venue. CUSMLM replied that General Otis preferred either Frankfurt or the USMLM Potsdam House and outlined US expectations from such a session: a prominent expression of Soviet regret over the incident (not one buried on a back page of Pravda) and a prohibition on the use of deadly force against the Missions under any circumstances (duplicating an analogous guarantee repeatedly made by CINCUSAREUR). CSERB objected, stating that US guard regulations prescribe exactly the same actions as Soviet ones. CUSMLM then presented him highlighted copies of the SMLM sighting card, which contradicted that point. These cards took CSERB by surprise; he

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evidently knew nothing about them and withheld comment, pending further study.

Discussions of the forthcoming meeting occurred with almost daily frequency over the next several days. Both the technical detail and substance of the agenda caused disagreement. On 10 April CSERB delivered his CINC's response to the USAREUR protest over the shooting. General Zaytsev categorically denied responsibility for Nicholson's death, restated and amplified the official Soviet version of events, and laid all blame squarely on US shoulders. He emphatically dismissed the charges of medical negligence, a particularly sensitive point for Moscow. In the most egregious falsehood of the document Zaytsev stated unequivocally: "GSFG servicemen, once they ascertain that trespassers (on a facility) are members of USMLM, have not used, do not use, and in the future have no intention of using weapons to detain or evict them from restricted areas." Further, he accused CUSMLM of failing to present an objective report on the incident, despite GSFG's magnanimity in allowing him "to acquaint himself with the circumstances at the scene." However, CINCGSFG did express his official regret over the incident, repeated the proposal to meet with General Otis, and appointed a deputy chief of staff to handle preparations for it.

The issue of sequencing struck the US as important. CINCUSAREUR's plan called for the CINCs to confer promptly, discuss urgent matters, and provide impetus to the staffs to develop effective solutions. This initial encounter would address the glaring discrepancies between the respective versions of events and the need for an unconditional guarantee of personal safety for MLM personnel. Staff meetings could then take up such topics as PRA reductions and other confidence building measure.

GSFG insisted on preliminary discussions to determine both the technical detail (venue, time, length, etc.) and range of specific issues to be covered at the sessions; the Soviet predilection for set-piece actions and aversion to improvisation shone clearly through. CSERB searched meticulously for historical precedent and found one in the 1962 encounter between two predecessors: the 1962 encounter between General Bruce Clarke and Marshall Ivan S. Kovev. He copied it wherever possible. Disagreements on many topics continued, and pace of action became frantic. On 11 April CINCUSAREUR replied to General Zaytsev's 9 April letter accepting the invitation and proposing to meet with 30 hours! On the afternoon of 12 April, with that time almost expired, CINCGSFG consented to do so: four hours hence. A compromise dictated that the meeting be held in Potsdam at the Soviet Officer's Club and USMLM Potsdam House. USMLM conscripted all its available personnel to support the plan. General Otis and his party arrived by plane at 1700 for the

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1800 meeting.

The meeting was conducted in a businesslike atmosphere, occasionally tough but always polite and restrained. It gave the respective CINCs the opportunity for extensive dialogue; virtually no one else participated in the formal discussion. By the end of the evening the generals had come to understand clearly each other's views, but neither convinced the other of their correctness or made any concessions. GEN Otis argued the American position that MAJ Nicholson was in an open area and well within his rights when he was shot without warning or provocation. He disagreed in principle with CINCSFG on a wide variety of matters pertaining to this and previous incidents involving USMLM. GEN Zaytsev proved patient, annoyingly repetitious, and sometimes preposterous in his assertions. CINCSFG reiterated the standard points in official Soviet pronouncements on the incident and added a litany of USMLM's past sins. Among the outrageous assertions which he dispensed without flinching: GSFG Military personnel have never employed force or weapons against members of the AMLMs; Nicholson's actions constituted an attack on a sentry guarding his post; and the sentry fired, in part, because it is common knowledge that the Missions employ their vehicles as lethal weapons!

General Otis received the anticipated rebuff on apology and compensation, with Zaytsev characterizing the demands as groundless. GSFG, he stated, bears no guilt with regard to the incident. Similarly, CINCUSAREUR's proposal to radically rethink the very premises of the PRAs, reduce their area, and recognize complete freedom of movement outside their borders met with a cool reception, although not outright rejection.

On balance the discussions provided only a reaffirmation of the status quo with minor embellishments at the margin. No real surprises occurred. Both CINCs committed themselves to support the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, confirm the principle of non-use of force against MLM members, direct their personnel to refrain from "provocations" (left undefined), and study further measures to prevent the recurrence of violent incidents. The US achieved two stated goals: a prominent statement of regret over MAJ Nicholson's death and at least a conditional guarantee of personal safety. However, CINCSFG made an explicit distinction between Soviet guard regulations -- which enjoy the status of a national law and he is powerless to change -- and his 1983 directive on the detention of MLM members; his recitation of the latter gave USAREUR for the first time the text of GSFG's position.

USAREUR's summation of the meeting noted the Soviets' refusal to accept blame, render apology, or pay compensation, acknowledged

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Zaytsev's expression of regret and presented and reported his command policy prohibiting the use of force during detentions. Interpretation of this report prompted misunderstanding in Washington and recrimination in Moscow. Although many US principals believed doggedly that he had done so, Zaytsev had granted no absolute guarantee of physical safety for MLM personnel.

As preparations began on both sides for negotiations on the prevention of violent incidents, consternation mounted. The misunderstanding on Zaytsev's guarantee of safety quickly found its way into print. Administration spokesmen asserted the unconditional nature of the promise, while Soviet statements disputed it. On 30 April Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt summoned Soviet Embassy DCM Sokolov to formally lodge a claim for compensation on behalf of the Nicholson family and express Washington's dissatisfaction on the continuing lack of an apology. Sokolov refused to accept the State Department note on the subject and complained of Burt's exclusive reference to the US version of events. That same day CINCUSAREUR dispatched a letter to CINCGSFG attempting to clarify the results of their 12 April meeting and requested that Zaytsev reconfirm, inter alia, that the GSFG instruction "prohibited the use of force against members of the Military Liaison Missions, whatever the reason." He proposed another face-fo-face meeting to resolve the issue.

The Kremlin's official response to these moves appeared two days later in the TASS article "Wouldn't a Responsible Approach Be Better?", published jointly by Pravda and Red Star. The article, while offering nothing new of substance, did contain an expanded expression of regret that mentioned, for the first time, the suffering of the Nicholson family. It also gave a misleading account of the "non-use of force" discussion conducted on 12 April. According to TASS, "both sides reiterated that weapons have not been used, are not used, and will not be used during detentions...of Military Liaison Mission personnel." The statement both left the impression of agreement where none existed and ignored the contradiction between Soviet guard regulations and GSFG's detention policy. Finally, the article charged "certain parties" with disseminating false versions of both the shooting and the CINC-to-CINC meeting so as to poison the atmosphere and distract attention from certain steps taken lately by Washington." Such attitudes, it said, would prevent the improvement in relations desired by the sides.

Zaytsev's personal reply arrived on 13 May, and it addressed General Otis' request for clarification even more bluntly. Reminding CINCUSAREUR that "the Soviet position was presented to you with extreme clarity at our last meeting" and "it was not the Soviet

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side that initiated new assertions and formulations on the actual circumstances of the incident," CINCGSFG recapitulated his understanding of the agreements reached on 12 April. MLM personnel, he said, must strictly observe the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, refrain from provocative actions, observe host nation laws, and avoid the places of disposition of military units. He asserted the dual validity of restricted areas and "places of disposition," noted the essential correspondence of US and Soviet detention procedures, and claimed that his forces "have not, do not, and will continue not to employ physical force or weapons" during detentions. However, he continued, "I want to stress that (the non-use of force) provision differs from the procedures applicable to a sentry on his post." This statement dispersed all doubt. Zaytsev also politely declined General Otis' invitation to meet prior to the staff discussions.

CINCUSAREUR responded on 16 May, concurring in the need for the staff solutions prior to a further meeting at high level. He also defined his expectations: the development of measures to unconditionally insure the safety of MLM personnel and a mutually accepted interpretation of movement restrictions. The Soviets later took this simple expression to be a definitive agenda which served their interests well. The CINCs had met and, as CSERB never tired of asserting, closed the incident completely. The resurrection of discrepancies, he stated, would achieve nothing while derailing the staffs' real work: the development of practical measures to prevent incidents. Thus, progress dictated movement, in the Soviet view; and the more rapid the movement away from the past, the better.

With permission to negotiate, USAREUR began planning. An ODCSI counterintelligence specialist and OJAG international lawyer were designated as participants, and General Otis personally appointed his Deputy for Resource Management BG(P) R. J. Price to lead it. Shortly, this body with the addition of CUSMLM, NavRep, and a liaison officer, became the "negotiating team".

In a 14 May cable USMLM predicted the nature of the forthcoming negotiations:

Just as Zaytsev conceded no points on 12 April and reaffirmed all his positions..., so too we can expect intransigence at the staff discussion. The Soviets' clear and annoyingly consistent prescription for measures to prevent recurrence shines through all their pronouncements: scrupulous adherence by the Missions to the Soviet interpretation of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, avoidance of any conduct considered by GSFG to be illegal or provocative, adherence to

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GDR regulations, and whenever in doubt, immediate and total submission to any command of a Soviet soldier. Thus, whatever corrective action is required, it relates only to the Allied side. The key to solving the problem lies simply in accepting the Soviet position. This neatly shifts responsibility for the Nicholson shooting and all violent incidents involving the Missions squarely onto Allied shoulders. In such a framework "confidence building measures" can only equate to acquiescence. Thus, we must expect the negotiations...to be extremely difficult and frustrating.

The cable also reiterated as proper USAREUR goals for the talks: resolution of the accounts of the incident, reduction of PRAs, toleration of MLM presence outside PRAs, achievement of an absolute prohibition on the use of force by Soviet or NVA forces against Mission personnel, and official recognition of USMLM's observer status as an offshoot of liaison duties.

On 15 May USMLM dispatched another cable to USAREUR on topics and goals. The message also listed considerations which should guide or characterize conduct of the talks:

1. The goals must be well-defined, simple, and accepted by all levels in advance.
2. All proposals must enhance the Missions' safety without degrading their collection.
3. The precedents established in over a decade of arms control negotiations with the USSR would be applicable.
4. Intransigence, repetition, caution, and inflexibility would characterize the Soviet negotiating style.
5. The negotiations would be bilateral in form but multilateral in essence, since the interests of BRIXMIS and FMLM would inevitably be affected. It would be essential to communicate and coordinate with the Allies during the talks.

From the outset both USAREUR and USMLM made a concerted effort to keep the Allies informed and solicited their opinions on a wide variety of topics. At the headquarters level communication occurred frequently at Tripartite Rapid Reaction Committee meetings. In Berlin coordination was effected more informally, among the Chiefs of Mission.

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Allied coordination had begun at a very early date and included an attempt to put teeth into the common anger. Although it became quickly apparent that none of the Allies possessed significant leverage over the respective SMLMs, the three headquarters, after reviewing the limited options, decided to implement certain measures to penalize GSFG, however slightly, for the shooting. First, they confined all SMLM personnel to their respective compounds on 28, 30, and 31 March -- the dates of the memorial services and burial -- "for their own protection". Second, they instituted increased overt surveillance of all SMLM tours, which continued until July. Third, they declared a boycott of social functions attended by GSFG and NSWP representatives for an indefinite period. Fourth, they denied the SMLMs the right to interzonal travel, since the basic agreements did not specifically authorize it; henceforth, the SMLMs could not visit each other's zones of operation. And fifth, they terminated provision of the additional supplies/privileges which had been routinely granted in a public relations effort and began supplying only the required commodities.

At the end of May, arrangements for the negotiations became a virtual preoccupation. USMLM maintained daily contact with SERB and USAREUR in an effort to devise acceptable solutions to rather straightforward problems, but Soviet inflexibility thwarted progress. GSFG's refusal to compromise either on the agenda or the technical details of the sessions prompted the frustration forecast earlier. Its pettifoggery duplicated the accounts of Soviet negotiating behavior at multiple international forums. GSFG attempted to dictate both the setting and the discussion. Via resourceful argumentation and inexhaustible patience, CSERB gave substance to the oft-quoted adage that, for the Soviets, "What's mine is mine; what's yours is negotiable."

Technical details included the composition of the delegations, border crossing procedures, venue, rotation, dates, the schedule of discussions, interval between sessions, and translation/recording support. On 24 May CUSMLM and NavRep met with CSERB to discuss them. Consensus emerged on some issues, including translation: NavRep and MAJ S. D. Savchenko would perform these functions. GSFG rejected the US proposal to employ a tape recorder rather than scribes, claiming that it would inhibit discussion; thus, the sides settled on note taking. However, the venue, particular rotation, and agenda caused major dissension. GSFG desired to host all the sessions, or at least the first one, so as to have the initial word. Arguing for the spaciousness and relative comfort of the Potsdam Officer's Club, CSERB applied pressure. CUSMLM countered by suggesting an analogous facility for the US-sponsored sessions: the Wannsee Guest Residence of the US Commander of Berlin. (The Potsdam House had recently entered overhaul, a process which would last over

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a year). CSERB rejected the idea, citing the special quadripartite status of the city. Likewise, he rejected all other alternatives which might deprive the Soviet side of the "home-court advantage." On this point the discussion reached an impasse. As agenda topics CUSMLM proposed the discrepancies in the sides' accounts of the shooting, procedures to ensure safety, and freedom of movement as guaranteed under the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. Curiously CSERB, who had urged the submission of an agenda, failed entirely to devise his own. However, he recoiled at discussion of the shooting - this had already been settled by the CINC's he argued. The meeting adjourned without a meeting of the minds.

The sides reconvened on 29 May but again made limited progress. CSERB continued to display inflexibility on all three thorny issues. CUSMLM tried yet another rotation alternative: Wuensdorf and Heidelberg/Frankfurt. COL Pereverzev rejected this idea as too time-consuming. Ultimately, and by default, the sides agreed to let sovereignty rule. The Potsdam Soviet Officers' Club would serve for the GSFG-hosted sessions, while the much more modest USMLM small villa would suffice for those held under USAREUR auspices. Discussion of the rotation though, returned the participants to deadlock, and deliberations on the agenda degenerated into a rehash of past objections. Discussion of the actual incident, CSERB said, would prompt recrimination without promoting progress. Such discussion had been concluded on 12 April, was no longer within the authority of the staffs, would detract from more important issues, and indicated a lack of American seriousness in pursuing real negotiations. CUSMLM replied that: Only an accurate understanding of events could underpin the development of appropriate preventive measures, the CINC's had not closed the incident but only agreed that their versions diverge, dictation of the agenda represented an unacceptable attempt by GSFG to censor discussion in advance, and the "discrepancies" represented the crux of the matter to the US. However, to make such a discussion more palatable to SERB he suggested including it in USAREUR's opening statement. This last idea at last struck a relatively responsive chord in Pereverzev, who had acknowledged the appropriateness of introductory remarks and argued against making them public. This alternative became the implicit solution.

Yet an additional session with SERB on 31 May saw no movement on the remaining contentious issue: rotation. GSFG even rejected USMLM's offer to let a flip of the coin determine the first host! CUSMLM recommended to USAREUR that it show principled adamance, stressing that the point at stake was not the petty specifics of any single consideration, but the known Soviet technique, predicted with accuracy, of dictating aggregate procedural detail and, thus, creating a habit of US concession. As CUSMLM reported: "We have to

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resist conceding on this...point. Too often in such negotiations we allow the Soviets to dictate procedural details which we consider too insignificant to argue about. This habit can creep over into substantive matters as well."

With time running out, General Price and the two negotiating team members from Heidelberg flew to Berlin, allowing USMLM to brief them on Soviet behavior, positions, personalities, and goals. General Price brought with him CINCUSAREUR's guidance and approved strategy. On 4 June, literally the eve of the planned first negotiating session, and in the midst of one such strategy conclave, SERB urgently summoned CUSMLM and NavRep to Potsdam.

CSERB opened the meeting by soliciting possible new USAREUR proposals, a clear ploy to determine whether USAREUR was prepared to concede the rotation issue. It was not, and CUSMLM had even brought a note from General Otis urging Zaytsev to overrule his negotiators; he opted not to present it yet. COL Pereverzev continued by declaring that "recent developments," which he was not wont to identify, had rendered the USMLM small villa totally unacceptable as a negotiating site. "Recent developments" referred to the 30 May dedication of the small house as Villa Nicholson, of which he had been unaware when he assented to its selection under the sovereignty principle. Not only did the villa bear MAJ Nicholson's name, but it also displayed his portrait prominently. GSFG refused to negotiate under his haunting gaze. The venue issue reopened, CSERB made several new proposals, all of which continued the attempt to secure home advantage. CUSMLM countered with the Frankfurt/Potsdam rotation, and Pereverzev for the first time seriously entertained the suggestion.

General Price also recommended to CINCUSAREUR that he send his counterpart a letter complaining about Soviet intransigence and proposing a solution. General Otis penned his own communication, which he dispatched as a memorandum to General Zaytsev, and USMLM delivered it to SERB on 6 June. CINCUSAREUR formally proposed the Frankfurt-Potsdam rotation, with USAREUR hosting the first session on 13 June. CINCGSFG accepted the offer but requested a one-day delay in starting. And thus, the stage was set.

NEGOTIATIONS: SESSION I

The USAREUR delegation led by BG(P) Price and the GSFG delegation under GEN-LT V. A. Semyonov (First Deputy Chief of Staff, GSFG) met for five hours at the Terrace Officers' Club in Frankfurt on 14 June. The arrangements for the session reflected understandings reached earlier, although the Soviets introduced one

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unexpected variation: the proposal to translate from native into foreign language, which reverses normal practice. The procedure however, caused no difficulty and set the standard for the remaining sessions: LTCOL Kelley translated into Russian, and MAJ Savchenko -- into English.

The discussions, while sometimes blunt, were conducted in a businesslike atmosphere with a limited degree of personal cordiality and considerable reticence. They produced no surprises or shifts in position and resulted in agreement only on secondary matters. General Price opened the session with a long statement that enumerated the discrepancies in the Soviets' account of the incident, pointed the finger accusingly, and restated the US position on apology and compensation. When offered a copy of the opening remarks, Semyonov retorted that he had no authority to exchange documents; one of his translators did, however, meticulously copy it longhand for retention, leaving the typed version behind.

General Semyonov responded with a much shorter statement, asserting that GSFG considered the purpose of the talks to be the development of practical measures to ensure personal safety and the improvement of relations between the commands. He termed the shooting tragic, regrettable, atypical, and closed. He also rejected the call for apology and compensation as groundless and placed all blame for the incident on the US generally and MAJ Nicholson specifically.

USAREUR argued for greater freedom and security for its personnel, while GSFG pressed for stricter adherence to restrictions; the approaches reflected the asymmetries of their Missions. Occasionally the sides discovered areas of mutual interest -- for example, the right to stop on Autobahns within PRA -- but normally for different reasons. The aggressive collection of military intelligence in a closed society usually mandates different conditions from those required for the recording of electronic signals or support of agent networks.

After much give and take the delegations reached agreement on the following points. The MLMs would observe/continue to observe the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, respect the laws of the host country, and refrain from provocative actions. Both sides expressed keen interest in substantial PRA reductions and in the right to stop on Autobahns which penetrate PRA; GSFG agreed to consider the issue of transit along PRA border roads, long the bane of the AMLM's existence. The parties remained divided on appropriate tour uniforms but consented to defer the issue. However, cardinal disagreement arose on the crucial questions: CINCUSAREUR's proposal to revise

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the premises underlying the PRAs, "places of disposition of military units" as a concept differing from PRA/TRA, the validity of Mission Restriction Signs (MRS), and the conditions under which Mission safety could be guaranteed. The last of these represented the negotiators' central concern.

On the one hand, USAREUR solicited an unconditional guarantee of safety for Mission personnel. On the other, GSFG argued that strict compliance with the Soviet understanding of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement coupled with unequivocal submission by MLM personnel to the orders given by a sentry already achieved that end. The GSFG instruction on detentions, Semyonov said, prohibited the use of force against MLM personnel (recognized as such) in unguarded areas, while Soviet national regulations provided for their safety (assuming submission) in guarded ones. In other words, the safe detention policy stopped at the limits of a sentry's post, at which point personal security became contingent on surrender. Even discounting the empty promise of the "safe" detention policy, the contradiction with USAREUR's position and with the needs of collection could hardly have been more vivid.

NEGOTIATIONS: SESSION II

On 20 June CUSMLM and NavRep met with CSERB in Potsdam. After coordinating the routine arrangements for Session II, to be held on 1 July, they discussed substantive issues at stake. Pereverzev reacted very pessimistically to General Otis' PRA revision plan but then presented an alternative approach which, while raising some problems, offered the possibility of major reductions. Personal safety, he continued, was the responsibility of Mission members; USAREUR would underwrite their safety, if it would ban their presence in Soviet training areas and require submission to detention. SMLM/F, he contended somewhat facetiously, already operated under such guidelines. He assured CUSMLM that his headquarters had instituted unilateral "practical steps" to prevent the recurrence of violent incidents and indicated, for the first time, serious interest in a Mission information card. Looking ahead, CUSMLM and CSERB also speculated on means by which to conclude the negotiations. Finally, Pereverzev reiterated that the "discriminatory measures" imposed on the SMLMs in the wake of the Nicholson incident must be lifted, if USAREUR desired to avoid reciprocity.

Session II was held on 1 July from 1000-1500A in the Potsdam Officers' Club. The discussion saw significant progress made on some topics, but at day's end most cardinal issues remained unresolved. General Semyonov, in reviewing the results of Session

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I, attempted to surreptitiously claim certain victories which his side had failed to win, but he also confirmed his headquarters' acceptance of the first session's positive achievements. He then announced the major policy shift foreshadowed by CSERB: HQGSFG intended to issue MLM information cards. But in other respects the Soviet position remained unchanged. GSFG rejected US calls for personal immunity, citing the rationale given before, and insisted that Mission personnel avoid the "places of disposition of military units" and guardposts; should they trespass accidentally, they must unequivocally obey the sentry's commands. The litany had become agonizingly familiar. However, Soviet charges regarding USMLM's wear of allegedly provocative BDU uniforms became more muted at Session II, perhaps indicating their insubstantial nature; USAREUR's accusations concerning the black leather jackets worn by SMLM/F members to permit disappearance into a crowd probably neutralized the issue.

GSFG also described its PRA reduction mechanism at the session and the means by which it might open additional cities. If, Semyonov stated, his command could effectively restrict the immediate vicinity of its kasernes, it could then afford to leave other urban areas accessible, including major transit routes. The idea, however, was predicated on USAREUR's acceptance of special restriction signs, and this principle caused considerable dismay. GSFG also expanded the scope of the discussions by introducing complaints about the "discriminatory measures," the procedures employed by USAREUR to process and release detained SMLM/F personnel (The Allied Contact Section-Frankfurt often escorted them back to their compound.), and the USMLM practice of pass rotation.

The US side repeated its standard call for apology and compensation and pressed for personal immunity; GSFG budged on neither. The discussion of personal immunity, though, raised the sensitive issue of military facilities in outlying areas. General Price acknowledged the danger of trespassing on ranges and impact areas and this was interpreted as acceptance of the use of certain warning signs. This drew the lines along which further battles would be fought.

Finally, the issue of possible further sessions arose. GEN-LT Semyonov demurred at the prospect, having obviously already tired of the negotiations. Considering his duty discharged, he deftly suggested assigning CSERB and CUSMLM the responsibility for fleshing out the principles to which the sides had assented; General Price accepted. The two generals also agreed to delegate production of a summary document to COLs Lajoie and Pereverzev; the solution satisfied all.

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Session II concluded with a typically lavish Soviet formal meal. In the best tradition of Soviet senior officers, COL Pereverzev mobilized his eloquence to offer an appropriate toast. The two delegations, he suggested, could report in good faith to their superiors that they had done yeoman's service to move their sides closer to a resolution of the issues. As the next few weeks demonstrated, however, the reality of that movement had yet to be gauged.

WORDS, WORDS, WORDS -- AND A RAMMING

Soviet assurances on personal security notwithstanding, an incident occurred on 13 July which revealed the continued fragility of the Mission's status. That GSFG's promises represented incremental rather than fundamental gains, had been clear, at least to USMLM. There were no delusions about radical transformation; change at the margin constituted the greatest hope. However, GSFG proved the hollowness of its pronouncements in an incident which, coming on the heels of the negotiations, threatened to scuttle the limited progress made to date and rekindle superpower confrontation.

In the period following the shooting CUSMLM had personally refrained from touring so as to prevent any possible high-level incidents that might jeopardize US interests. With the formal negotiations apparently concluded, he broke his fast, joining MAJ R. D. Lyons USA and SSG Schatz on the local. While covering a return to garrison of 35 MRD, the tour encountered a VAI ZIL-130 on the Fahrland Road. The vehicle gave chase, tailgated dangerously, and ultimately rammed the tour car from the rear as it rounded a corner in Satzkorn. Although more likely the consequence of recklessness than premeditation the collision inflicted facial injuries on CUSMLM and, by rupturing the gas tank, could easily have resulted in a lethal conflagration.

NavRep, acting as the Chief of Mission, protested to CSERB, and C/S USAREUR MG C. J. Fiala USA summoned CSMLM/F to do likewise. The tremors from Washington no doubt reached the Kremlin; word reached Berlin that Secretary Weinberger was considering the termination of the negotiations and institution of certain other measures.

Several days later GSFG responded via the same channels. Its investigation indicated the culpability of the VAI crew -- a warrant officer and his driver -- who had engaged in an unwarranted chase and impacted the tour vehicle, albeit unintentionally. HQGSFG stated that it viewed the incident very seriously. According to CSMLM/F the servicemen involved were severely punished and dismissed from the Army; their actions had violated the command's policy. CSERB underscored that this decision demonstrated GSFG's willingness

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to discipline its own. The Pentagon, which had initially assumed both premeditation and lack of contrition, accepted the response as a tacit apology, although the Soviets carefully avoided use of the word. It backed off the sharp rhetoric which had accompanied publicity of the incident and, to GSFG's chagrin, made the outcome public. Upon CUSMLM's resumption of his duties on 24 July, CSERB quickly expressed displeasure at the publication of his words, attributing it to the indiscretion of the NavRep. In actuality, the Pentagon had made that decision, overriding the opposite recommendation of all lower echelons in the chain of command.

With the situation thus defused, USMLM returned to the matter at hand: production of the summary document. On 10 July CSERB had presented his first version of the understandings, and it became clear that the struggle over the document would emulate battles fought during the negotiations themselves. His summary took a very hard line on all the issues and asserted the interests of GSFG almost exclusively. In attempting to give substance to the term "provocation," for instance, CSERB offered the following definition: "Insulting a military administration or police representative, deliberately causing a situation that endangers personnel or inflicts physical damage/injury on them, or physically resisting or failing to submit to the orders of those effecting a detention of Mission personnel." Other features of his draft included a prohibition on the entering of firing ranges/training facilities located in open areas, respect for various kinds of signs, scrupulous submission to the orders of a sentry, and the right to -- in effect -- create restricted sectors within open areas. The remaining proposals ranged from the tolerable to the desirable; however, CSERB described his most unacceptable formulations as "cardinal issues" on which the headquarters would brook no compromise.

On 24 July, at a meeting with CSERB, CUSMLM replied to the proposed GSFG summary document by pointing out the provisions which USAREUR viewed as unacceptable. As no doubt anticipated, they included the four "cardinal issues". However, in light of developments at Session II USMLM had to address GSFG's concerns about signs and "places of disposition". Thus, CUSMLM and NavRep developed the following rather nebulous catch-all formulation: "Each side recognizes the authority of the other to take such steps as may be required to implement the provisions of Article 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement." This purposely vague language adequately covered the issues without specifically enumerating them. It had the advantage of diluting precision and perpetuating the kind of "grey area" upon which intelligence collection depends. Each side could interpret the formulation unilaterally and argue for its own position. Actually USMLM would have preferred not to engage

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in such casuistry at all, but the issues of signs had been put on the table and could no longer be ignored. The catch-all formulation represented a calculated ploy by which to thwart GSFG's efforts. Ultimately, the gamble paid even greater dividends than those which USMLM hoped to attain, but in the short run the formulation prompted consternation both among the Allies and in the US chain of command.

CSERB also announced an unexpected change relating to the map exchange. Whereas earlier GSFG had argued against a negotiated PRA map exchange, preferring to simply present a map to which the Allies would then respond, it now insisted on one: a simultaneous exchange incorporating the provisions to which both sides assented. He specified these provisions as: the inclusion of no more than 25% of the respective territory in PRA, total opening of the seats of mission (except for military facilities), the opening of other major cities, and no creation of de facto PRAs. But it was evident that room for movement still existed.

The next version of GSFG's summary document, dated 29 July, addressed some of USAREUR's concerns. In compiling this document, CSERB made three important concessions. First, he deleted all mention of signs of any sort, reluctantly accepting instead the catch-all provision devised by USMLM. Second, he eliminated reference to scrupulous obedience to a sentry's commands, in its place exempting sentries from the GSFG instruction on detentions. And third, he acknowledged that the detaining side could also act provocatively, an assertion which he had consistently denied until then. In a moment of disarming candor he also opined that, while the commands could minimize incidents, it seemed unlikely that they could eliminate them altogether.

HQUSAREUR, which now anticipated the imminent conclusion of deliberations, reviewed the bidding in detail and responded in detail. At the same time the debate continued on the appropriate means by which to end the negotiations. Should the document be signed, initialed, exchanged, or read aloud? USMLM recommended taking the least formal approach, since it implied the least constraint. CSERB also seemed interested in informality, since it preserved the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. However, CINCUSAREUR had received instructions to develop a formal product for review by the Interagency Group, which superseded all other desires. That group would then weigh the results of the negotiations and determine an appropriate US response.

On 2 August CUSMLM and NavRep presented the HQUSAREUR proposals. Many of the amendments made cosmetic or insubstantial changes, but several points led to emotional objections from CSERB. First, he categorically rejected the US headquarters' removal of the

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sentence concerning a sentry on his post, arguing that GSFG had already diluted its wording in consideration of USAREUR's desires. Second, he strenuously objected to a US refusal to allow local military police to investigate detentions of SMLM personnel and release them. He then articulated two threats which were to surface on more than one occasion later. Should USAREUR not release detained SMLM tours locally, SERB would institute similar procedures for handling detentions of USMLM, to include an escort back to Potsdam. And should the new PRA map fail to completely open Frankfurt, he would close the area stretching from Potsdam to the Dallgow-Doebritz complex to a similar extent. However, CSERB's opposition to wear of the BDU uniform waned substantially. GSFG had just witnessed a change of command in which General of the Army Pyotr G. Lushev replaced Mikhail M. Zaytsev as CINC. Lushev, it was hinted, might view the issue differently; CSERB stopped just short of identifying Zaytsev as the impetus behind that provision.

The leave season coincided with recognition by both sides that their work was nearing an end. As the 2 August session adjourned, both CSERB and CUSMLM expected a slow month during which the headquarters would reconsider their positions and evaluate the document. Surprisingly, two meetings in the next two weeks -- during which time CSERB was away -- showed that maneuver room still remained. On 8 August CUSMLM met with DCSERB COL V. Ye. Medved' and learned that GSFG had accepted some of the less momentous USAREUR changes, although it continued to insist on inclusion of the provision addressing a sentry on his post. The Soviets backed even further away from objections to the BDU uniform, now describing it simply as "inappropriate". However, they attempted to interject an additional provision into the discussions, one instituting a permanent news blackout: "Without mutual consent of the two contracting parties both sides agree not to release to the mass media any information on the results of the GSFG/USAREUR staff negotiations or other activities of the MLMs." Whether this unexpected suggestion was an unsanctioned probe or had some other basis, could not be determined; CUSMLM dismissed it as unnecessary, and discussion of the topic abated. However, SERB also announced that GSFG had rethought its position on the formality of the concluding document and now favored signing it. In all likelihood, the new position reflected Lushev's preference, if not his instructions.

On 13 August USAREUR developed what it termed the "final US position" on the negotiations, but the title quickly became a misnomer as DCSERB summoned CUSMLM for another unanticipated meeting on 14 August. Without inquiring about a possible USAREUR reaction to the last set of Soviet proposals, he introduced new ones. These, he said, represented a compromise that blended the positions of the

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sides. Many of the changes reflected semantic rather than substantive differences, but some were fundamental. For instance, GSFG transformed the sentry formulation into a requirement to obey the demands of those effecting detentions. The commands were to institute "identical procedures" for the investigation and release of detained MLM personnel, rather than entrusting US military police with that function. And the BDU issue disappeared altogether.

HQUSAREUR reviewed this latest Soviet proposal, drafted a reply, and dispatched it for delivery. CUSMLM relayed it to SERB on 29 August and, responding to a US-imposed deadline, suggested 6 September as a date for possible signature of the document. GSFG's answer arrived precisely then, but it did not entail a signature. Instead, CSERB said that his headquarters found the draft both inconsistent with previous US positions and deficient in certain important respects. Accordingly, he had prepared a counter-proposal. Pereverzev's version limited the MLM guarantee of safety to "during detentions", reinserted the requirement for identical detention investigation procedures, added back the catch-all provision, and reintroduced the formulation concerning a sentry on his post, but now with a twist. Instead of demanding submission to the sentry's commands, the formulation simply required that MLM personnel be briefed on his special procedures. This point, while not entirely satisfying USAREUR's concerns, represented a major concession by GSFG. As distasteful as it might be, the wording reflected a practice employed by USMLM for many years. The Mission found it objectionable because of the possible implication that Nicholson might have survived, had he only been briefed. In actuality, all Mission personnel know full well the procedures used by a sentry. Knowledge is not the problem.

USAREUR responded with its actual "final position" on 11 September. On that date CUSMLM and NavRep presented a document which made the following substantive changes: It dropped the caveat "during detentions" from the MLM safety guarantee, deleted reference to briefings on a sentry's procedures, and called for "similar" vice identical detention investigation procedures (The last point reflected only the absence of a komendatura system in USAREUR, precluding identical procedures.). CSERB promised to study the document.

The 11 September meeting marked the beginning of a three-month hiatus in the discussions. In the face of frequent prodding by CUSMLM about a response, CSERB asked forbearance, claiming that the matter was out of his hands. All suspected that the document had been sent to Moscow, although SERB never confirmed so.

A stillness descended on the negotiating front, lasting until

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December. In the interim the time passed quietly, save for two events: the 19 September posthumous promotion of MAJ Nicholson to Lieutenant Colonel and the November summit conference between Reagan and Gorbachev. The promotion was announced by the White House. Secretary Weinberger personally conducted the ceremony in his office and addressed harsh words toward Moscow: "(T)his outrageous murder testifies to the ruthlessness of the adversaries we face... There can be no rationalization of this act -- no justification. There can be no adequate compensation." But his rhetoric remained out of reach of the press, and the promotion, which under some circumstances might have affected the negotiations, did not. The Summit, however, fundamentally influenced the climate of Soviet-American relations and probably explained the protracted delay in GSFG's response. Its import became apparent later.

On 15 December NavRep requested from DC SERB a copy of the latest GSFG summary proposal, which he received the following day. The document contained several administrative errors, confusing the situation, but in essence it repeated the 6 September position of GSFG with one change: deletion of the phrase "without surveillance or escort" from the provision on detention investigation procedures. The recognition that no movement had occurred prompted USAREUR to call for a third formal negotiating session, which after some shuffling was slated for 30 December in Potsdam. At a 27 December preparatory meeting CSERB complicated matters by announcing yet another change in the GSFG proposal: a rewrite of the USMLM catch-all provision. The subterfuge of veiled language had evidently dawned on HQGSFG, and CSERB tightened the US verbiage considerably: "To recognize the right of each headquarters to take the particular steps deemed essential to prevent members of the Military Liaison Missions from inadvertently intruding onto the places of disposition of military units or military facilities." CUSMLM complained about this last-minute change, and CSERB responded by claiming that GSFG had made a series of concessions to accommodate USAREUR's desires, but without reciprocity. He also questioned the good faith of the US side. At the conclusion of the meeting the colonels both realized that, even with general officers present at the next session, agreement might prove elusive.

NEGOTIATIONS: SESSION III

Session III occurred with a new head of the Soviet delegation, GEN-MAJ L. K. Bugrov, who replaced Semyonov as First Deputy Chief of Staff, GSFG. More dynamic than his predecessor and more familiar with the considerations despite his newness on the scene, Bugrov appeared to enjoy greater authority as well, perhaps reflecting General Lushev's desire to conclude the negotiations expeditiously.

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He gave the impression of a problem-solver willing to make decisions and not just refer to matters back to the headquarters for resolution. Much of the progress made at the session attested to his performance.

The talks led to tentative agreement on the text of the summary document. It contained compromises on several contentious points which had long separated the sides. GSFG quickly accepted all of the less significant changes which USAREUR proposed; most reflected superficial touches. Point 3, the crux of the document, resulted in a split. The US ultimately accepted the sentry briefing requirement, while GSFG agreed to delete the restricting caveat "during detentions" from its version of the personal safety clause. A real surprise occurred with regard to the "catch-all", and it came as a direct consequence of CUSMLM's persistent prodding. Not only did GSFG acquiesce on this score; it eventually agreed to scrap the provision entirely! One could read the consternation on CSERB's face, but fatigued, he accepted Bugrov's judgment, adding: "But we will still detain COL Lajoie, when he goes behind signs!" Thus, USMLM attained elimination of even the veiled reference to signs which it had, itself, concocted. It was a better outcome than one could possibly have expected.

General Bugrov ended the session by announcing that, in consideration of the progress achieved, the spirit of the Geneva Summit, and the intense work done by HQGSFG since that time his command could provide the Allies with a new PRA map as early as 3 January. Of course, the offer assumed a simultaneous exchange, so the Allies' speed of preparation would determine the actual exchange date. This news took the US counterintelligence specialist LTC R. L. Gambolati quite by surprise. He hazarded a guess that the Allies could respond within three weeks, but events demonstrated the optimism of his estimate.

THE APPROVAL PROCESS

Ultimately the understandings reached on 30 December received the blessing of both the Soviet and American chains of command, but the approval process required in excess of three months. Both sides had to defend their actions and decisions in the face of skepticism from various quarters, but in the end both succeeded in doing so. Still, the fate of the document swung perilously until 10 April, and maneuvering continued until literally the hour of the signing ceremony.

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GSFG initiated the action on 3 January by resurfacing our resilient nemesis; the issue of the sentry. On that date USMLM responded to a call by CSERB for a discussion of the summary formulations. CINCSFG, it seems, had reviewed and approved the 30 December summary document -- with the exception of the sentry formulation. While Gen Lushev accepted the wording worked out at Session III, he desired to expound on it and set it off as a second paragraph in point 3. Specifically, he proposed that the following version of the sentry provision be written as paragraph two: "Mission members will be continuously briefed on the special procedures which apply to a sentry on his post; the requirements of the instruction card do not extend to his actions." (underscoring added). Since the added verbiage contributed nothing of substance to the formulation except to make it more specific and thereby complicate the approval process. CUSMLM advised rejecting this rather idiosyncratic proposal and explaining that the US side had acquiesced to the sentry formulation only with great reluctance; elaboration would only jeopardize the accords.

After deliberation GEN Otis adopted this course of action. On 9 January he dispatched a letter to his counterpart presenting two alternatives: either GSFG could eliminate all reference to the sentry on his post or it could accept the formulation as derived on 30 December. GEN Lushev responded to this letter on 17 January with yet another variation on point 3 -- one which the US side had totally rejected on 30 December! This formulation still expressed the sentry provision as a separate paragraph and, while dropping the specificity of its second clause, reintroduced the limiting phrase "during detentions" into the guarantee of MLM safety.

CINCUSAREUR dispatched yet another letter to CINCSFG, this time proposing that the CINCs meet personally to resolve the issue. No doubt his response took Lushev by surprise; on 29 January CINCSFG replied that: "For reasons beyond his control" he could not meet with GEN Otis in the near future, however, he had directed his staff to thoroughly review all the options and transcripts so as to permit a final decision on the summary document.

On 3 February CSERB was assigned the onerous task of conveying to CUSMLM GEN Lushev's decision to back down. In determining his course of action CINCSFG, Pereverzev stated, had taken into account not only GEN Otis' letters but also MG Price's statements at Session III. He concluded that the 30 December formulation, buttressed by this additional material, adequately covered the requirements of a sentry. Having transmitted this embarrassing message -- and avoided putting it in writing -- Pereverzev went on to other, less unpleasant topics, including the PRA map exchange. In response to an inquiry CSERB replied that GSFG insisted that the PRA coverage limit of

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25.1% pertain to each and all Allied sectors of the FRG; his command would not accept an overage in any of the zones, even if offset in another. Pereverzev said that GSFG was quite interested in expediting the exchange, and Pereverzev again inquired about the pace of Allied work. He was told that while the initial estimate of 2-3 weeks had proven to be very optimistic, work on the map was continuing.

Several days later, on 7 February, USAREUR reported the text of the agreed summary to Washington via the chain of command. The transmittal message contained a legal defense of the decisions taken by the US side and explained the rationale for adopting it. On 18 February CUSMLM flew to Washington to brief those involved in the Interagency review process.

In Washington the Interagency Group studied the concluding document in meticulous detail. Although nearly all agencies represented there welcomed the results of the negotiations -- particularly when acquainted with the major shifts which the US side had forced in the Soviets' initial position -- elements in OSD still interposed some objections.

Finally, on 3 April, USAREUR received the long-awaited message of approval from OJCS. In a compromise solution, OSD had consented to accept the document as written on the condition that State Department continue to pursue the issues of apology and compensation in political channels, whenever appropriate. The NSC blessed this solution, and the President accepted it, setting the stage for the final act in the negotiations' protracted history.

With approval in hand, CUSMLM approached SERB to arrange for the signing ceremony. So as to preclude possible misunderstandings, he delivered copies of both the English and Russian versions of the text for the final document, as we understood them. It was only then that both sides realized that their texts differed slightly. The Russian title was shorter and their paragraph two contained an additional (and superfluous) word. While the slight differences could be explained as linguistic accommodations and certainly not substantive it could not be denied that the respective higher authorities had not approved absolutely identical versions of the text. GSFG's penchant for secrecy and unwillingness to provide USAREUR with copies of its document underlay the textual problems. Had CUSMLM not undertaken to ascertain the correspondence of the texts, the sides would have continued laboring under the illusion of correspondence until the reality of the signing ceremony. As it was, small divergences which, if recognized in early January, could have been harmonized without great ado, now made for an awkward situation. The US side did, however, agree to use the shorter title

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and allowed the additional word in paragraph two of the Russian text. At that point the Soviets presented a final copy for inspection and yet another and potentially thornier difference was discovered: the format for point three. The US version, reflecting our understanding of the 30 December understandings, expressed the entire point as a single paragraph, while the Soviet version set off the final sentence -- the sentry formulation -- as a second paragraph within that point. At a meeting held on 7 April the two chiefs presented their arguments and tentatively agreed on a means by which to accommodate their positions. Recognizing that no differences of substance separated the two versions, the Soviets agreed to accept our version on the English text, and we would use their version on the Russian one. Admittedly, the solution begged the issue, but given the reluctance of both sides to reapproach the respective chains of command and thus reopen battles already fought and won, it represented a workable compromise. At this same meeting Pereverzev also resurrected a long-dormant notion for concluding the negotiations by simply shaking hands and agreeing to abide by the provisions of the summary document without actually signing it. Since it had been agreed and permission received to sign the document this idea was rejected.

On 8 April as the USMLM and GSFG negotiators were preparing to depart for the signing ceremony, slated to be held at the headquarters building in Heidelberg on the following day, ODCSI USAREUR passed an urgent message. There would be no haggling at the signing ceremony: Either the Soviet delegation comes prepared to sign the US version of the document without the dangling sentence in point three or it should not come at all. A series of messages flashed back and forth between the headquarters over the remainder of the day, and both delegations remained in place.

Late on 8 April CUSMLM again met with CSERB in Potsdam to review the options and discuss developments. They determined that the format of point three remained the sole contentious issue and agreed that the two generals could best thrash it out in Heidelberg. Both sides would bring texts for the alternative versions, both generals would be empowered to make the requisite decisions, and they would do verbal battle. HQUSAREUR was briefed on this proposal and it was accepted. Thus, on the strength of this understanding the sides left to conduct Session IV of the negotiations and, hopefully, to sign an agreement. The schedule had slipped one day, until 10 April.

Session IV took place in the conference room of the Keyes Building in Heidelberg. The US side had evaluated the limited range of options and expected a brief encounter, quick agreement, and signatures within about an hour; instead, the session lasted from 0930-1530. The US side read an opening statement, as it had done at

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each of the other negotiating sessions. GEN-MAJ Bugrov responded by declaring that his side clearly understood the genesis of the problem -- bureaucratic loose ends -- and did not attribute the impasse to malice on the US side. The GSFG delegation, he stressed, had come to the West intending to sign an agreement, but the delegations must first find a logical way out of the situation. A very candid series of exchanges followed, with each side presenting the merits of its own case and arguing against the other's. A range of alternatives emerged, including Pereverzev's outdated proposal to conclude the negotiations with a handshake. Both sides bargained hard, confronted the realities of common bureaucratic difficulties, and to quote GEN-MAJ Bugrov, "laid their cards on the table."

The sides ultimately decided that an imperfect but acceptable solution to the problem lay in accepting the slightly differing format for point three in Russian and English. The Soviets, however, needed additional rationale by which to justify taking this path. At length, Bugrov approached LTC Elliott, the USAREUR JAG representative and specialist in international law, and solicited his professional opinion on the legality and ramifications of such a solution. Failing initially to obtain an unequivocal answer, he asked point blank whether Elliott would confirm in writing the authenticity of the Russian and English texts on the reverse side of all the original documents. The US side expressed surprise at the curious request but agreed, for it evidently provided Bugrov with a means by which to placate his chain of command.

And thus it was that finally, at 1430 on 10 April 1986, MG Price and GEN-MAJ Bugrov affixed their signatures and exchanged copies of the "Agreed Summary of Joint US Army Europe and Group Soviet Forces Germany Staff Discussions" a document which will be known informally within USMLM as the "the Nicholson Protocol". So as to fulfill the directives imposed by the Interagency Group MG Price at the end of the session read a brief closing statement that stressed that the US Government would not consider the incident closed until apology and compensation had been received, recommended the development of further measures by which to improve the safety of MLM personnel, and expressed the fervent hope for an improvement in relations between USAREUR and GSFG.

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CONCLUSIONS

USMLM emerged from this tortuous period scarred but intact. The loss of a comrade reinforced to all concerned the vulnerability which surrounds some forms of intelligence collection; USMLM touring will never be quite the same again. The period also gave the AMLMs a degree of prominence which bordered on notoriety; public attention both jeopardized the position of the Mission and impeded collection. The consensus among tour personnel supports as expeditious a return to shadowy obscurity as circumstances will permit.

The Mission discharged its unanticipated duties with resiliency and thoroughness. Those involved can take pride in their performance. In confronting GSFG with the foreseeable results of its policies, in defending the interests of the United States and the Nicholson family in a hostile environment, in protesting Soviet repulsive behavior, in attending to the vital needs and soothing the emotional wounds of the bereaved, in paying tribute to a fallen fellow Missionary in services broadcast nationally, in articulating USAREUR strategy to national level agencies, in dealing hardheadedly with Soviet negotiators, in devising farsighted goals and pursuing them, and in myriad other ways the personnel of USMLM demonstrated their versatility and dedication. The task remains to recover from the period, reenter the operational environment in full force, and exploit the advantages which promise to accrue from the results of the negotiations.

The US team fulfilled the stated USAREUR negotiating goals, which were to:

1. Ensure no degradation of operational capabilities.
2. Clarify the details of the shooting, officially presenting the facts established by the US side and rejecting the Soviet version.
3. Stress throughout the talks that the incident will be closed only when an apology is rendered and compensation paid.
4. Establish procedures to insure the safety of all Mission personnel.
5. Review the question of freedom of movement so as to reduce Permanent Restricted Areas and improve transit throughout the GDR.

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From the perspective of USMLM the most positive aspects of the negotiations were the development of a new and reduced PRA map and the provision to GSFG servicemen of an MLM information card. The former promises access to hitherto closed areas by dramatically reducing PRAs and lifting certain restrictions on movement; the latter will codify and bring to the attention of the Soviet soldier in the ranks the legal status of the MLMs and conditional guarantee of safety which his command has granted. Both provisions will improve operating conditions for the Missions.

Certain observers have pointed out potential pitfalls in the summary document, but USMLM believes their concern unjustified. Their objections relate to:

1. Respect for the law and order of the host nation. Respect, however, differs from obedience, as CSERB freely acknowledged using the example of diplomats. This apt analogy demonstrates the approach which USMLM will take when touring. Before deciding on a particular course of action personnel will "consider" local law and precedents, but not necessarily obey them.
2. Avoidance of provocative acts. Inevitably the sides will define "provocation" in the manner which best serves their interests, and USMLM successfully rejected CSERB's attempt to unilaterally impose his interpretation. Loose language suits USMLM in this case. The charge of provocation can always be rejected as a difference of opinion.
3. Regular briefings on the procedures employed by a sentry on his post. Admittedly, this provision causes consternation in light of its implications, but it reflects consistent USMLM practice anyway. The formulation more closely touches on perception than substance. GSFG will not change its guard regulations, regardless of pressure from the Allies. This very diluted wording will force no operational change in USMLM's approach to the environment. It is a provision which USMLM can accept, albeit with reluctance.

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In a broader sense the negotiations provided certain unique insights into the position of the SMLMs and the behavior of the Soviets. Most often, speculation rather than real information has shaped our image of the SMLMs' role in the FRG; USMLM's experiences shed light on the SMLMs' needs and value.

First, the negotiations upended the commonly held myth of the AMLMs' institutional vulnerability. According to long unquestioned views, the Soviets believe that the Western Allies' need for the Missions exceeds their own. Accordingly, some Allied officials act in ways that actively limit MLM activities and options, imposing a form of self-censorship. Daring change, they contend, could upset the situation sufficiently that the USSR would abrogate the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, thus depriving the US of a most valuable collection asset. Such views vastly underestimate the strength of Soviet attachment to the SMLMs. Throughout the course of negotiations, the USSR, both in political and military channels, expressed consistent and unwavering dedication to its Missions. Whatever the rationale, Moscow would not put them at even tentative risk. Whether this stance reflected the lingering political benefits of occupation rights, desire for ELINT collection platforms, support of agent networks, gathering of military intelligence, or some other purpose(s) could not be judged. However, Moscow's unwillingness to jeopardize the status of its Missions and outspoken insistence that the Huebner-Malinin Agreement remain sacrosanct suggest a degree of value which we ignore only to our own detriment.

Second, GSFG showed unusual sensitivity to publicity, either about the shooting itself or its Missions in general. Indeed, publicity became Moscow's Achilles' heel. Multiple statements by DCM Sokolov in Washington and by Semyonov, Bugrov and Pereverzev in Potsdam evidenced an acute aversion to the disclosure of even seemingly inoffensive information; the desire for discretion cannot fully explain Soviet reactions. However, such secretiveness does track with the needs of an organization engaged in true clandestine activity.

Third, the SMLMs require access to medium and large-sized urban areas to do their work, whatever its nature. Further, they maintain some vital link with the Soviet Embassy in Bonn which the need for "new movies", as CSMLM/F once put it, cannot adequately explain. The 1984 PRA map issued by the Allies in response to GSFG's version nearly doubled the amount of restricted territory, often achieving this end by closing heretofore open cities. With time, and by analyzing GSFG's proposals for new PRA guidelines, a visceral Soviet attachment to both the seats of mission (Frankfurt, Baden-Baden, Buende) and other major cities became apparent. The likely use of embassy facilities for the exfiltration of acquired material,

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replenishment of stocks, and receipt of instructions also cannot be discounted. Thus, a substantial -- but still circumstantial -- case can be built around the suspicion that the SMLMs support clandestine operations in some unspecified manner.

Soviet negotiating tactics provided a virtual casebook study of the lessons learned in arms control dealings with the Soviets over the past 15 years. CSERB initially attempted to define the technical arrangements for the talks, so as to determine the negotiating environment. Next, he tried to shape the agenda by vetoing disagreeable topics. Then he selectively marshalled precedent to indicate how things "must" be. He refused to concede even secondary points or to leave any decision to chance; CUSMLM's frustrated proposal to decide the initial rotation by flip of the coin was anathema. Pereverzev displayed nearly inexhaustible stamina in repeating old formulations and official government positions; his patience rarely faltered. Reiteration never embarrassed him, nor did deadlines constrain him. He reacted to the ultimatums which USAREUR occasionally announced with alternating scorn and indifference. CSERB attempted to gain real US concessions today in return for the promise of possible Soviet consideration tomorrow; reciprocity never proved an operative principle. On one occasion he attempted to claim via sleight of hand and deft summarization points which his side had actually failed to win during the negotiations! Pereverzev prepared for meetings with exemplary thoroughness, briefed his generals well, and could always muster ample documentation or cite historical antecedents. The reverse side of his trait, however, was noticeable inflexibility. CSERB disdained improvisation, and the unanticipated left him nonplussed. In short, he proved tough, clever, capable, and resourceful, but he also had failings. Fortunately, USMLM expected as much, warned the command, and prepared to deal with his efforts. History will inevitably judge the results.

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Appendix 1: Chronology

CHRONOLOGY

1545A/24 March 85 MAJ A. D. Nicholson, Jr. shot and killed at Ludwigslust Subcaliber Range 475

1715A/25 March 85 USMLM returns MAJ Nicholson's body to Berlin

28 March 85 O. M. Sokolov, DCM of Soviet Embassy- Washington, protest USMLM actions to Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Burt

29 March 85 USMLM delivers protest letter from CINCUSAREUR to GEN-COL G. F. Krivosheyev, C/S GSFG

29 March 85 USMLM escorts MAJ Nicholson's body to Washington. Vice President George Bush meets aircraft, makes statement sharply critical of Moscow

30 March 85 Interment of MAJ Nicholson in Arlington National Cemetery

30 March 85 Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin meets with Secretary of State George Shultz to discuss shooting, consequences

30 March 85 Secretary of State Caspar Weinberger calls for apology, compensation

12 April 85 Meeting between General Glenn K. Otis, CINCUSAREUR, and General of the Army Mikhail M. Zaytsev, CINCGSFG

30 May 85 Dedication of Villa Nicholson at USMLM Potsdam compound

14 June 85 Session I of USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations held in Frankfurt

01 July 85 Session II of USAREUR-GSFG Negotiations held in Potsdam

10 July 85 CSERB presents initial GSFG proposal for negotiations summary document

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13 July 85	CUSMLM injured during Soviet ramming of USMLM local tour
11 September 85	CUSMLM presents final USAREUR counterproposal for negotiations summary document
19 September 85	Secretary of Defense posthumously promotes MAJ Nicholson to lieutenant colonel
16 December 85	SERB provides copy of final GSFG proposal, with no essential change in position
30 December 85	Session III of USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations
10 April 86	Session IV/Signing Ceremony for Summary Document concluding USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations

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Appendix 2: CINCUSAREUR Protest Letter on Shooting

March 26, 1985

General Mikhail M. Zaytsev
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

General Zaytsev:

With this letter, I am lodging an official protest of the gravest nature.

At approximately 1545 hours, 24 March 1985, one of your soldiers deliberately shot and murdered an unarmed member of my military liaison mission, Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., in the vicinity of Ludwigslust, East Germany. Following the shooting, your Soviet soldier also prohibited the administering of emergency lifesaving measures by Major Nicholson's driver, Sergeant Jessie G. Schatz. This wanton act of violence is the most serious in the 38 year history of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

You are aware that the Huebner-Malinin Agreement provides that the members of our liaison missions are to be permitted complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever desired over the territory and roads in both zones. The only exceptions to this free travel guarantee have been the permanent and temporary restricted areas periodically established by our sides. Major Nicholson was not within one of your restricted areas; he was exercising his legitimate right of free travel. The fact that the sentry clearly recognized the mission vehicle and mission personnel and still opened fire indicates that this action had the tacit approval of Headquarters, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG). It is also unconscionable that your soldier and his superiors did not allow Sergeant Schatz to administer first aid to Major Nicholson.

On 19 March 1985, personnel from your Soviet Military Liaison Mission-Frankfurt, were detected violating a permanent restricted area in the U.S. Army, Europe zone near Hof. When they were detained by our forces on 20 March for that violation, they were treated, as always, in a civil, safe, and professional manner. No one was harmed. Conversely, the actions by your soldier in this latest incident were completely uncalled for and show a total disregard for human life.

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I strongly protest this violent action by your soldier which has resulted in the needless and unjustified death of one of my officers, who, like your liaison officers, was unarmed. I demand a full investigation and explanation of this incident, that measures be taken to insure that the personnel responsible are punished, and that measures be implemented to insure that an incident such as this will not recur.

Glenn K. Otis
General, U. S. Army
Commander in Chief

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Appendix 3: CINCSFG Reply to Protest

Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany

9 April 1985

No. 157

General:

As Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany I note with regret that your letter on the 24 March 1985 incident, involving personnel in the American Military Liaison Mission, contains no acceptance of responsibility by the American side.

A thorough and complete examination irrefutably attests to the fact that the incident occurred because representatives of USMLM flagrantly violated paragraph 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, dtd 3 April 1947, which states: "Each member of the mission will be given identical travel facilities, to include identical permanent passes in the Russian and English languages, permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except for places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision."

On Sunday, 24 March, violators in camouflaged uniforms riding in a vehicle with licence plates smeared with dirt trespassed on a closed military facility and penetrated onto a military equipment guardpost. One of them broke open a metal window shutter and entered a storage shed.

In this situation the sentry had no opportunity to identify the vehicle and assumed that the trespassers had sabotage in mind. Acting in strict accordance with military regulations (which are approximately the same in all armies), he demanded in Russian and in German that the trespassers halt, then fired a warning shot upwards. Had Major Nicholson complied with the legal demands of the sentry, his life would not have been endangered, but he failed to submit to them. Instead, he attempted to reach his vehicle at any cost so as to hide there with his acquired intelligence, thus compelling the sentry to use his weapon.

I want to call your attention to the fact that, having complied with the demands of the sentry, SSG Schatz was not subjected to forceful action of any kind.

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There is also no basis for accusing the Soviet side of allegedly prohibiting SSG Schatz from aiding Major Nicholson. SSG Schatz not only made no attempt to do so, but even categorically refused to leave his vehicle, making reference to an order not to abandon it.

It was specifically on the initiative of Soviet soldiers that a doctor was immediately summoned; he pronounced Major Nicholson's death to have been practically instantaneous.

The totality of the actions by USMLM personnel bore the clear stamp of intelligence collection, as confirmed by the developed film from the camera. The penetration of a military equipment post guarded by a sentry was an especially dangerous act.

The eviction of liaison mission personnel from restricted areas is an altogether different issue. GSFG personnel, when confident that trespassers are members of USMLM, have not, do not, and in the future have no intention of using weapons to detain or evict them from restricted areas.

This was the case even in such a critical situation as when members of USMLM, having been detained for collecting intelligence in a restricted area near Rohrbeck, district of Potsdam, intentionally ran over a Soviet officer, inflicting severe bodily injury on him.

In the 24 March incident the Soviet side displayed consideration and self-control by inviting the Chief of USMLM, Colonel Lajoie, to the scene of the incident. At that site and together with the Chief of Staff of GSFG, he had the opportunity to acquaint himself with the circumstances surrounding the incident and to report to his headquarters just what had occurred with Major Nicholson and who was at fault in the matter. We are now convinced that Colonel Lajoie failed to present an objective report on the occurrence. In light of this (COL Lajoie's report) an attempt is currently being made (by the US) to substitute a totally different issue - the eviction of trespassers from restricted areas - for the actions of a sentry in the performance of his duties.

I, as the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, regret the tragic outcome of the 24 March 1985 incident, however, the responsibility for it lies entirely with the American side.

In this connection I reject your protest and all charges directed against HQ GSFG and the Soviet sentry and request that you take effective steps to ensure strict compliance by the American side with the 1947 (Huebner-Malinin) Agreement.

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General, in accordance with an understanding reached between the Soviet and American sides, I agree to meet personally with you so as to conclude our review of this incident.

With your concurrence, I propose that the meeting take place in Wuensdorf or Potsdam (Officer's Club).

So as to prepare for the meeting, I believe it advisable to direct that a Deputy Chief of Staff of GSFG meet with Chief, USMLM in Potsdam to clarify the issues subject to discussion and examine possible measures by which to prevent similar incidents involving members of military missions in the future.

(SIGNED)

M. ZAYTSEV
General of the Army

To General Glenn K. Otis
Commander in Chief
US Army, Europe

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Appendix 4: Composition of the Delegations for USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations

USAREUR Delegation:

BG (Later MG) Roger J. Price	Deputy Chief of Staff, USAREUR
COL Roland Lajoie	CUSMLM
LTCOL (USMC) Lawrence G. Kelley	DCUSMLM (Naval Representative)
LTC Ronald L. Gambolati	Counterintelligence Representative, HQUSAREUR
MAJ (Later LTC) H. Wayne Elliot	Legal Representative, HQUSAREUR
CAPT (USAF) Werner S. Hindrichs (Sessions 1-3)	Liaison Officer, USMLM

GSFG Delegation:

GEN-LT Viktor A. Semyonov (Sessions 1 & 2)	First Deputy Chief of Staff, GSFG
GEN-MAJ Leonid K. Bugrov (Session 3 & 4)	
GEN-MAJ Sergey S. Shevtsov	CSMLM/F
COL (SAF) Yuriy V. Pereverzev	CSERB
LTC Yuriy I. Tetyakov	Senior Officer, SERB
MAJ Sergey D. Savchenko (Sessions 1-3)	Translator, SERB
MAJ (SAF) Yevgeniy V. Zyurin (Session 4)	Translator, SMLM/F
SR. LT. Mikhail I. Styopkin (Sessions 1 & 2)	Translator, SERB
SR. LT. Dmitriy V. Naumenko (Session 3)	Translator, SERB

[REDACTED]

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Appendix 5: Initial GSFG Proposal for Summary Document
(10 July 1985)

SUMMARY OF THE WORK

done by Representatives of the Staffs of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the US Army in Europe.

In the course of their joint work the staff representatives of GSFG and USAREUR have studied issues attendant to ensuring the safety and freedom of movement of personnel in the Military Liaison Missions, and have agreed as follows:

On the issue of ensuring the safety of personnel in the Military Liaison Missions

1. Strictly observe the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of 1947.
2. Ensure that Mission personnel respect the law and order of the host nation.
3. Prohibit Mission personnel from taking any kind of provocative actions.

The following are considered provocative actions: Insulting a representative on the military administration or police; deliberately creating a situation which endangers the personnel surrounding it or causes them material damage; physically resisting or failure to submit to the orders of those effecting a detention of mission personnel.

4. Categorically forbid Mission personnel from trespassing on training areas or firing ranges located in open areas, the borders of which are enclosed by signs reading "Halt-firing in progress!" or "Passage [by vehicle or on foot] forbidden!"

5. Explain to Mission personnel that, should any of them through unforeseen circumstances find themselves on a guarded military facility, their safety can be guaranteed only via scrupulous compliance with the commands/orders of the sentry.

6. Ensure that all soldiers are regularly briefed on and strictly observe the "Instructions on Actions to be Taken When Detaining Military Liaison Mission Personnel". The instructions must specify the rights of MLM personnel and give orders which ban the use of physical force or weapons against them or the commission of other acts which threaten their safety.

[REDACTED]

7. Permit Military Liaison Mission personnel touring the GDR or FRG to wear any uniform -- other than a camouflaged one -- authorized by their respective armed forces, with distinctive military rank insignia.

On the issue of observing the principle of freedom of movement for Military Liaison Mission personnel.

1. Significantly reduce the coverage of the permanent restricted areas in the GDR and FRG on the basis of reciprocity and parity.

2. Open the cities where the Military Liaison Missions are quartered and all roads providing entrance to or exit from these cities for unrestricted travel by Mission personnel.

3. With the introduction of new permanent restricted area maps, open the permanent and temporary restricted area border roads for unrestricted travel by Military Liaison Mission personnel. Mission personnel will also be allowed to stop at rest stops and gas stations located on autobahns which pass through restricted areas.

4. So as to ensure that the demands of point 1 are met, each side has the right to impose restrictions on the travel of Military Liaison Mission personnel along roads/streets adjacent or leading to some military facilities located in open areas. This will be accomplished by erecting special signs. Such signs may not be used to close off main or transit roads/streets.

5. Authorize military police officers (military commandants of GSFG) to investigate the circumstances surrounding a detention of Military Liaison Mission personnel right at the site of the detention. After the investigation has been completed mission personnel may continue along their chosen route without surveillance or escort.

6. Strictly adhere to the provision in Article 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement which authorizes Military Liaison Personnel to travel freely, "without escort or surveillance."

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Appendix 6: Final Summary Document From Session 3
(30 December 1985)

AGREED SUMMARY OF JOINT USAREUR AND GSFG STAFF DISCUSSIONS
CONCERNING THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO
THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF
IN GERMANY

WITH THE GOAL OF PREVENTING INCIDENTS INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO CINCGSFG AND CINCUSAREUR, STAFF REPRESENTATIVES HAVE HELD JOINT DISCUSSIONS ON ENSURING THE SAFETY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF SUCH MISSION MEMBERS. AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. TO CONFIRM THAT THE 1947 HUEBNER-MALININ AGREEMENT REMAINS VALID AND UNCHANGED AND ENSURE THAT ALL ITS PROVISIONS ARE STRICTLY OBSERVED.
2. THAT MILITARY LIAISON MISSION MEMBERS ENJOY SPECIAL STATUS AS A RESULT OF BEING ACCREDITED TO THE RESPECTIVE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF. THEY WILL RESPECT THE LAW AND ORDER OF THE COUNTRY WITHIN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED AND WILL NOT COMMIT PROVOCATIVE ACTS.
3. THAT ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL BE INSTRUCTED ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF MISSION MEMBERS AND RECEIVE INSTRUCTION CARDS WHICH ADDRESS THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED WITH REGARD TO THEM. AT A MINIMUM, THE CARDS WILL STIPULATE THAT THE USE OF FORCE OR WEAPONS AGAINST MISSION MEMBERS OR THE COMMISSION OF OTHER ACTS WHICH COULD THREATEN THEIR SAFETY IS CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED. THE SEARCH OF MISSION MEMBERS OR THEIR VEHICLES IS ALSO PROHIBITED. MISSION MEMBERS WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY BRIEFED ON THE SPECIAL PROCEDURES WHICH APPLY TO A SENTRY ON HIS POST.
4. TO ESTABLISH SIMILAR PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING DETENTIONS OF MISSION MEMBERS. UPON THE COMPLETION OF AN INVESTIGATION THE DETAINED MISSION MEMBERS WILL BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE THEIR TRAVEL.
5. TO REDUCE ON A MUTUAL BASIS THE PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS (PRA) AND OPEN FOR FREE MOVEMENT BY MISSION MEMBERS THE CITIES WHERE THE MISSIONS ARE LOCATED AND THE ROADS WHICH PROVIDE ENTRANCE TO OR EXIT FROM THEM. WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW PRA MAPS ABOLISH THE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT BY MISSION MEMBERS ALONG AUTOBAHNS AND ROADS WHICH BORDER RESTRICTED AREAS.

THIS SUMMARY IS WRITTEN IN ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN, BOTH TEXTS BEING AUTHENTIC.

ROGER J. PRICE
MAJOR GENERAL, GENERAL STAFF
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE AND
SEVENTH ARMY

LEONID K. BUGROV
GENERAL-MAJOR
FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES
IN GERMANY

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[REDACTED]

СОГЛАСОВАННЫЕ ИТОГИ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЕЙ ШТАБОВ ГСВГ И СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ

С ЦЕЛЮ ПРЕДОТВРАЩЕНИЯ ИНЦИДЕНТОВ С ЧЛЕНАМИ ВОЕННЫХ МИССИЙ СВЯЗИ, АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ПРИ ГК ГСВГ И ГК СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ, ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯМИ ШТАБОВ БЫЛИ ПРОВЕДЕНЫ ПЕРЕГОВОРЫ ПО ВОПРОСАМ ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И СВОБОДЫ ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЯ ЧЛЕНОВ ЭТИХ МИССИЙ. В РЕЗУЛЬТАТЕ ЭТИХ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ СТОРОНЫ ДОГОВОРИЛИСЬ О СЛЕДУЮЩЕМ:

1. ПОДТВЕРДИТЬ ДЕЙСТВЕННОСТЬ И НЕИЗМЕННОСТЬ СОГЛАШЕНИЯ "ХЮБНЕР-МАЛИНИН" 1947 ГОДА, ОБЕСПЕЧИТЬ СТРОГОЕ СОБЛЮДЕНИЕ ВСЕХ ЕГО ПОЛОЖЕНИЙ.

2. ЧЛЕНЫ МИССИЙ ИМЕЮТ ОСОБЫЙ СТАТУС, ПОСКОЛЬКУ ОНИ АККРЕДИТОВАНЫ ПРИ СООТВЕТСТВУЮЩИХ ГЛАВНОКОМАНДУЮЩИХ. ОНИ БУДУТ УВАЖАТЬ ЗАКОНЫ И ПОРЯДКИ СТРАНЫ ПРЕБЫВАНИЯ, В КОТОРОЙ ОНИ НАХОДЯТСЯ, И НЕ БУДУТ СОВЕРШАТЬ ПРОВОКАЦИОННЫХ ДЕЙСТВИЙ.


3. ВСЕ ВОЕННОСЛУЖАЩИЕ БУДУТ ПРОИНФОРМИРОВАНЫ О ПРАВОВОМ ПОЛОЖЕНИИ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ И ПОЛУЧАТ ПАМЯТКИ-ИНСТРУКЦИИ О ПОРЯДКЕ ДЕЙСТВИЙ ПО ОТНОШЕНИЮ К НИМ. КАК МИНИМУМ, В ЭТИХ ПАМЯТКАХ ДОЛЖНО БЫТЬ УКАЗАНО, ЧТО ПРОТИВ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ КАТЕГОРИЧЕСКИ ЗАПРЕЩАЕТСЯ ПРИМЕНЯТЬ СИЛУ, ОРУЖИЕ ИЛИ СОВЕРШАТЬ ИНЫЕ ДЕЙСТВИЯ, КОТОРЫЕ МОГУТ УГРОЖАТЬ ИХ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ, А ТАКЖЕ ОБЫСКИВАТЬ ЧЛЕНОВ ВМС И ИХ АВТОМАШИНЫ.


ЧЛЕНАМ МИССИЙ БУДЕТ ПОСТОЯННО ДОВОДИТЬСЯ ОСОБЫЙ ПОРЯДОК ДЕЙСТВИЙ ЧАСОВОГО НА ПОСТУ.

4. УСТАНОВИТЬ СХОДНЫЙ ПОРЯДОК РАЗБОРА ЗАДЕРЖАНИЙ ЧЛЕНОВ ВМС. ПОСЛЕ ЗАВЕРШЕНИЯ РАЗБОРА ЗАДЕРЖАННЫМ ЧЛЕНАМ МИССИИ БУДЕТ РАЗРЕШАТЬСЯ ПРОДОЛЖАТЬ ДАЛЬНЕЙШЕЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ.

5. НА ВЗАИМНОЙ ОСНОВЕ СОКРАТИТЬ ПЛОЩАДЬ ПОСТОЯННЫХ ЗАПРЕТНЫХ РАЙОНОВ (ПЗР), ОТКРЫТЬ ДЛЯ СВОБОДНОГО ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЯ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ ГОРОДА, В КОТОРЫХ РАЗМЕШЕНЫ МИССИИ, И ДОРОГИ, ПО КОТОРЫМ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЯЕТСЯ ВЪЕЗД В ЭТИ ГОРОДА И ВЫЕЗД ИЗ НИХ. С ВВЕДЕНИЕМ НОВЫХ КАРТ ПЗР ОТМЕНИТЬ СУЩЕСТВУЮЩИЕ В НАСТОЯЩЕЕ ВРЕМЯ ОГРАНИЧЕНИЯ НА ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЕ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ ПО АВТОБАНАМ И ДОРОГАМ, ЯВЛЯЮЩИМСЯ ГРАНИЦАМИ ЗАПРЕТНЫХ РАЙОНОВ.

ДАННЫЙ ИТГОВЫЙ ДОКУМЕНТ НАПИСАН НА РУССКОМ И АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКАХ, ПРИ ЭТОМ ОБА ТЕКСТА ЯВЛЯЮТСЯ АУТЕНТИЧНЫМИ.


ЛЕОНИД К. БУТРОВ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОР
ПЕРВЫЙ ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЬ НАЧАЛЬНИКА
ШТАБА ГРУППЫ СОВЕТСКИХ ВОЙСК
В ГЕРМАНИИ


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ПО ОПЕРАТИВНЫМ ВОПРОСАМ

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